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INTRODUCTION
A slave in chains is as free as the master.1
— Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialist
Instead of denying the existence of objective reality, [we should
acknowledge] that subjective and objective reality sort of create each
other.2
— John Wheeler, Quantum Physicist
You can never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change
something, build a new model that makes the old model obsolete.3
— Buckminster Fuller, Thinker and Architect
During slavery, when whites ruled blacks by law, vigilance, and
violence, blacks fought and died, all in the name of their natural, normal
claim to freedom. In addition to fighting and dying, they ran away so often
that southern planters called it a “disease.”4 Using guile and wit, slaves
escaped, hiding within earshot of their masters. Having escaped, Harriet
Jacobs lived for seven years in an attic space over her master’s head.5
1. Sonia Kruks, Beauvoir, Gender, and Subjectivity, 18 SIGNS 96, 96-97 (1992).
2. MICHAEL TALBOT, MYSTICISM AND THE NEW PHYSICS 25 (1993) (quoting Princeton
physicist John A. Wheeler).
3. R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, CRITICAL PATH 251 (St. Martin’s Griffin ed., 1982).
4. See Samual A. Cartwright, Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race, 11 DE
BOW’S REV. S. & W. STS. 331, 331-33 (1851) (listing a disease called “Drapetomania” which
causes slaves to run away).
5. See HARRIET JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL 99 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1988) (1861) (telling the story of her enslavement and escape). Harriet Jacobs was
born in 1813 as a slave but she procured her freedom after years of hiding. Id. at 199-200,
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Working slowly, slaves frustrated the master’s desired yield. Using
sabotage, slaves destroyed tools, making their exploitation inefficient.
Feigning sickness, they resisted. Denmark Vesey, future revolt leader,
pretended to suffer from epilepsy.6 When not running, slaves used sheer
intelligence, patience, and planning. In 1848, Ellen Craft, a white mulatto,
dressed like a man, hid her visage behind bandages of a false injury, and
refused to talk.7 By her side, ever attentive and properly cowered, the
faithful slave was her husband. Believing in their right to be free, Craft and
her husband walked and rode their way to freedom.8
Choosing to fight and die, slaves showed us their power to act
purposefully. The power to act is human agency, and these actions can
support or transform society. Through social and cultural influences,
society can constrain or empower ordinary people9 to act by giving them
relatively equal access to the rules, resources, and language. By supporting
or transforming a society, we express a latent, inexorable power that rejects
the thought that white structural oppression negates ordinary people’s
subjectivity, thus making them subtextual victims.10 Within a broad
structuralist framework, white structural oppression refers to practices like
racism that constitute an objective, external power that robs people of their
natural right to be free human beings. Subtextual victims refer to ordinary
people like blacks who believe that America will always treat them badly,
preventing them from attaining social and economic success. For these
ordinary people, experiences like subtextual victimization and practices
like white structural oppression belie human agency (e.g., right action).11
223. Jacobs originally published her story in 1861 under the pen name of Linda Brent. Id.
at xiii.
6. THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON, BLACK REBELLION, FIVE SLAVE REVOLTS 101
(1998).
7. See DEBRA J. DICKERSON, THE END OF BLACKNESS 33 (Pantheon Books 2004)
(1959) (describing how Ellen Craft’s deception was a form of active resistance).
8. See SHIRLEY J. YEE, BLACK WOMEN ABOLITIONISTS: A STUDY IN ACTIVISM 18281860 24-25 (1992) (explaining that after Ellen and her husband escaped slavery they became
involved in the abolitionist movement).
9. By ordinary people, I mean non-elite Asians, blacks, American Indians, Latinos,
whites, and women, including immigrants.
10. Cf. Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory
Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 76 (1993) (arguing that colorblindness or
treating all people equally, regardless of race, makes it “impossible to remedy pre-existing
discrimination”). Nunn further argues:
The word “tyranny” begins to describe the second kind of symbolic harm suffered
by Black defendants. . . . The trial of a Black person before an all-white jury gives
the appearance of a privileged elite passing judgment over the fate of an inferior.
At the symbolic level, the jury is no longer a neutral institution but one controlled,
dominated and possessed by whites.
Id. at 110-11.
11. See SHUNRYU SUZUKI, ZEN MIND, BEGINNER’S MIND 23-49 (Trudy Dixon ed., 1970)
[hereinafter ZEN MIND] (discussing Right Practice in Zen meditation, and how, as humans,
to express our true nature, we must learn to understand our true selves, without any
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Although ordinary people like blacks exercised human agency within the
crucible of slavery, Critical Race Theory (“CRT”) builds its methodology
on the idea that law, race, and power oppress ordinary people, denying
them the right to live free and to act purposefully.12 Race Crits have
developed deconstructive approaches to unearth how law and race form
powerful, objective relations of whites over blacks, men over women,
natives over foreigners.
Relying on this methodology and these
approaches, Race Crits, especially in early writings, analyzed unconscious
white racism.13 Given CRT’s early development, these writings were
perforce theoretical. Recently, some Race Crits have sought practical,
serviceable tools to assist lawyers and activists.14 Practical writings cope
better with struggles against white racism. Practical writings talk to
community activists.15 They enable political lawyers to examine and
transform legal conflicts into practical solutions or legal remedies. These
writings encourage left scholars to leave the ivory tower, so that they can
work with the ordinary people for whom Race Crits purport to write and on
whom their scholarly existence depends.16 Under this view, Race Crits can
redress white structural oppression and engage in antisubordination
struggles, so that ordinary people can use their human agency.

distractions).
12. See Francisco Valdes et al., Battles Waged, Won, and Lost: Critical Race Theory at
the Turn of the Millennium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTION, AND NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY
1, 1-3 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the history of CRT and such concepts
as anti-essentialism and race as a social construct).
13. See Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987) (arguing that racism affects
everyone and that whites are often totally unconscious of their racially biased thoughts and
actions).
14. See Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in
CROSSROADS, DIRECTION, AND NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379, 389-90 (Francisco Valdes
et al. eds., 2002) (positing that Race Crits need to get into the field and do work beyond the
academic setting).
15. See id. (focusing particularly on coalition building between different racial
communities as well as between intellectuals and grass roots activists).
16. See, e.g., Keith Aoki & Margaret Chon, Introduction: Critical Race Praxis and
Legal Scholarship, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 35, 36-38 (1999) (noting that justice is experienced
through practice, not simply a theoretical ideal); Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of our
Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53, 68-69 (1999) (asserting that racism in our
society is related in part to the separation of civil and political rights from economic and
social rights); Robert S. Chang, Facing History, Facing Ourselves: Eric Yamamoto and the
Quest for Justice, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 111, 114-18, 131 (1999) (discussing the theories
and ideas of Eric Yamamoto and their application to current problems in racial relations);
Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for Social Change: What’s a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 201, 215-19 (1999) (looking to critical race praxis and social lawyering theories as a
means of change); Eric K. Yamamoto, Practically Reframing Rights:
Culture,
Performance, and Judging, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 887-90 (2000) (exploring the ways
to change the attitudes and the experiences of jurists and lawyers, and discussing the role
culture plays in the legal process).
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In this regard, Robert A. Williams advocates for Critical Race Practice
(Practice).17 Eric K. Yamamoto sues for Critical Race Praxis (Praxis).18
For Williams, traditional legal scholarship, especially ethereal writings,
cannot alter ordinary people’s lives.19 Exploiting people of color’s
personal and social circumstances for institutional gains like tenure,20
Williams asserts that these Race Crits become little more than vampires,21
feeding on a people’s misery, caring selfishly for themselves, and giving
nothing back.22 By not using their writings to redress day-to-day issues,
these Race Crits ignore ordinary people’s oppression.23 To overcome this
gap, Practice requires left scholars to teach law students, especially through
clinical legal education, how to empower Native people and their
perspectives.24
17. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 95
MICH. L. REV. 741, 753-55 (1997) (recounting his life and experiences, Williams posits that
scholars must go beyond theory and actually “practice”). Williams advances that it is
important to serve the legal needs of underprivileged groups and that simply publishing
theory or deconstructing racial groups is insufficient for social change. Id.
18. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 829 (1997)
(“Critical race praxis combines critical, pragmatic, socio-legal analysis with political
lawyering and community organizing to practice justice by and for racialized communities.
Its central idea is that racial justice requires antisubordination practice. In addition to ideas
and ideals, justice is something experienced through practice.”).
19. See Williams, Jr., supra note 17, at 748-50 (asserting that legal scholarship is only
accessible and useful to a small group of legal scholars interested in the same area of the law
and that such theory is essentially useless to the marginalized or oppressed groups they are
discussing); see also Robert A. Williams, Checks and Balances and Balances:
Understanding the Legacy of White Patriarchy in an American American Indian Cultural
Context, 24 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1023-24 (1990) [hereinafter Williams, Checks and Balances]
(describing some of the problems of legal analysis in the inter-cultural context by stating,
“The problem for those who would practice outsider jurisprudence is to understand an
American Indian cultural context according to its own terms —terms that possess meaning
for American Indian people—instead of terms derived from a much different cultural
perspective grounded in the legacy of white patriarchy.”).
20. See Williams, Jr., supra note 17, at 744 (referring to experiences with law
professors by stating, “They cared about one thing and one thing only: themselves. You
see, as I soon came to learn, I had been hired to make them and their law school look
good.”).
21. See id. at 743-55 (using the term “vampire” to describe law professors who are
entirely separate from the real world). Williams argues that the tenure process at many law
schools transforms young excited intelligent minority professors into “vampires,” meaning
that they stop interacting with the outside world and lose their ability to make meaningful
social change. Id. at 753-55.
22. See id. at 743 (separating himself from this attitude and describing how his
upbringing enforced in him the sense that he was obligated to provide service to his
community).
23. See id. at 759 (using his own story as an example, Williams described how he spent
so much time working on legal theory that he ignored the requests for help from local
American Indian groups). Regarding his position, he stated, “What these Arizona American
Indians really wanted me to do was to get off my critical race theory ass and do some
serious Critical Race Practice. They didn’t give a damn about the relationship between
hegemony and false consciousness. They wanted help for their problems, and I was a
resource.” Id.
24. See id. at 762 (summarizing his career and finding that he truly began Critical Race
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Under Praxis, Yamamoto argues that left scholars must serve ordinary
people’s practical needs.25 Right now, these scholars do not relate to
political lawyers and community activists. By existing in separate worlds,
neither group has helped to co-create26 “racial justice.” As such, theoretical
writings and traditional civil rights strategies move institutions not toward
racial justice, but toward liberal solutions.27 So long as this gap continues,
law will retreat from racial justice. In surmounting this gap, Yamamoto
requires scholars, lawyers, and activists to work together (e.g., consortium).
Under Practice or Praxis, Williams and Yamamoto intend to pursue a
justice concept, in which antisubordination becomes the singular end.28
This end promises to give to ordinary people, especially those engaged in
interracial conflict, the human agency (or empowerment) that they lack.
For example, Yamamoto advocates for a “racial group agency,” one oddly
standing on racial identity and personal responsibility.29
Unfortunately, Practice and Praxis cannot achieve this end. Relying on
classical CRT methodology, Williams and Yamamoto assume that ordinary
people like blacks lack human agency and personal responsibility. They
presume that white structural oppression buries ordinary people alive under
the weight of liberal legalisms like Equal Protection, rendering them
subtextual victims.30 I disagree.
Pure consciousness is always prior, and all sentient beings have agency.
Despite the sheer weight of the legal violence, slaves never forgot their
innate right to be free; they retained a pure consciousness that never itself

Practice when he started a Tribal Law Clinic at a law school).
25. See Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 876 (emphasizing the need to look at specific real
world problems, such as a grievance over racial discrimination, and the need to incorporate
the lessons of CRT to find an appropriate solution).
26. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and the
Multiracial Category Movement: A Critical Reply to Professor Hernandez, 20 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 231, 287 n.2 (2000) (defining co-creation by stating, “each of us has been
socially conditioned, principally in our primary environments, to accept that race, race
consciousness (e.g., thinking of ourselves in racial terms), racism, and white supremacy are
naturally occurring (e.g., human nature) and socially inevitable.”); see also Pierre Schlag,
Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37, 37 (1987)
(providing an overview and a critical look of the works of Stanley Fish). To understand its
code you must decode it, and the very act of decoding constitutes an encoding, or the
creation of new text. Id.
27. See Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 830-35 (citing to other scholars who believe that
the focus of critical race theorists on incremental change led to stagnation rather than social
change).
28. See id. at 854-55 (discussing the need for all groups to recognize the ways in which
they shape the structures of oppression, and stating that only when the focus is on
eliminating any type of inter-minority hierarchy will there be justice for all groups).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 842 (“In terms of constraints on self-definition, law has played a powerful
role in imposing identities on racialized minorities as a way of excluding them from full
participation in American life.”).
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was enslaved.31 Moreover, slaves acted purposefully when they picked
cotton and when they fought to be free. Slaves planned revolts, killed
masters, overseers, and each other, ran away, picked cotton, and betrayed
other co-conspirators; all examples of human agency. Today, despite
danger and violence, ordinary people co-create lives of joy, peace, and
happiness. Antebellum slaves co-created spaces in which they knew joy,
peace, and happiness. In the modern era, ordinary people like blacks have
pure consciousness and human agency too.
Despite daily examples of human agency, Williams and Yamamoto posit
that ordinary people lack real, practical control over their lives.32 By taking
this position, they reproduce a major premise in CRT: slavery, Jim Crow,
racism, and racial discrimination have subordinated the lives of ordinary
people.33 Put succinctly, white structural oppression (e.g., supremacy)
impacts the micropractices of ordinary people. By implication, it negates
their racial identity, social values, and personal responsibility. If so, then
criminal courts mock ordinary people like blacks when the state punishes
them for committing crimes.34 If so, the New York Times unfairly
punished Jayson Blair, and he was correct to fault it for encouraging
plagiarism and for rewarding his unprofessional behavior.35 Failing to
address these implications, Williams and Yamamoto direct us to white
structural oppression and divert us from the real, practical control that
ordinary people exercise when they go to work or commit a crime. In this
31. See JANE ROBERTS, SETH SPEAKS: THE ETERNAL VALIDITY OF THE SOUL 40 (1994)
(asserting the inviolability of the soul and that each soul selects from a range of
consciousnesses by which it focuses its energy).
32. See Michael Olivas, The Chronicle, My Grandfather’s Stories, and Immigration
Law: The Slave Traders Chronicles as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 429-30
(1990) (discussing stories of resilience in the history of three oppressed groups—the
Cherokee, the Chinese and the Mexican). Compare Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms
Together: Multicultural Constitutionalism in a North American Indigenous Vision of Law
and Peace, 82 CAL. L. REV. 981, 996-97 (1994) (discussing the history of the Iroquois and
their vision of law and peace), with Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native
Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 101-10 (1998) (analyzing the historic
struggle of Polynesians throughout the process of colonization in Hawaii).
33. See Robert S. Chang, Critiquing “Race” and its Uses: Critical Race Theory’s
Uncompleted Argument, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTION, AND NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 87,
87 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (focusing on the CRT mantra that race is a social
construct devised through a history of oppression); Catharine A. Mackinnon, Keeping it
Real: On Anti-Essentialism, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTION, AND NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY
71, 71 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (addressing the effect of CRT on critical
feminism and the movement for gender equality).
34. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (arguing that, with the extent of bias in the
United States criminal justice system, race may be a legitimate factor for a juror to
consider).
35. See Clay Calvert, Journalistic Malpractice: Suing Jayson Blair and the New York
Times for Fraud and Negligence, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 2-4
(2004) (covering Jayson Blair and the repercussions of his acts of plagiarism while working
for the New York Times).
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way, Williams and Yamamoto can only empower ordinary people if they
eradicate white racism, for only then will ordinary people have human
agency.
Practice and Praxis fail because they ignore how ordinary people use
mind constructs. A mind construct means any artificial, causal, or
interdependent arrangement of facts, factors, elements, or ideas that flows
from our inner awareness.36 Representing core beliefs,37 a mind construct
allows us to make sense of our personal experiences and social reality. A
mind construct is not reality, but ordinary people believe that it is.38
Practice and Praxis also fail because they refuse to deconstruct mind
constructs of ordinary people. Intending to adhere to CRT’s methodology,
Williams and Yamamoto believe that these mind constructs cannot cocreate experiences, and thus white structural oppression must be an
external, objective reality.
By refusing to interrogate these mind
constructs, they tell us that the proper locus of white structural oppression
must be white mindsets. By and large, while white mindsets co-create
racial oppression, other mind constructs cannot. Whites have power; others
do not. Whites victimize blacks; ordinary people cannot co-create their
own oppression experience.39
Working within CRT methodology,
Williams and Yamamoto cannot re-imagine ordinary people as bearers of
human agency, the power to act purposefully that includes how we use our
mind constructs to co-create and to understand experiences and realities.
By failing to see ordinary people as powerful agents, Williams and
Yamamoto have tied personal liberty not only to liberal legalism and white
appreciation, but also to CRT’s liberal agenda.40

36. See ROBERT E. ORNSTEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 2 (2d ed. 1986)
(positing that humans are limited by what they believe and that the true boundaries of our
abilities are hidden by what we believe is real).
37. See JANE ROBERTS, THE NATURE OF PERSONAL REALITY: A SETH BOOK 46 (1974)
(“It is the core belief which is strong enough to so focus your perception that you perceive
from the physical world only those events that correlate with it.”).
38. See ORNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 21-23 (finding that most people never challenge
the reality they perceive and fail to understand the many other factors that exist outside of
human consciousness).
39. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 126 (1999) [hereinafter INTERRACIAL JUSTICE] (discussing the
ability of a mob or group to attack or oppress another group without individual
responsibility and arguing that the individual person cannot act as a great perpetrator within
society).
40. See generally JOHN MCWHORTER, AUTHENTICALLY BLACK: ESSAYS FOR THE BLACK
SILENT MAJORITY (2003) (discussing that problems arise because blacks continue to define
themselves in racialized ideals); JOHN MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF SABOTAGE IN
BLACK AMERICA (2000) [hereinafter MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE] (critiquing the civil
rights movement and suggesting ways in which black and white Americans can change their
behavior to reach social justice); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A
NEW VISION FOR RACE IN AMERICA (1995) (arguing that blacks are more oppressed by their
own beliefs than the presence of racism).
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Ordinary people have always had human agency. But Race Crits cannot
imagine this power. They must alter our core beliefs to sustain their
theories. A core belief flows from feelings and imaginations, and ordinary
people reinforce this belief through words and deeds. From this core
belief, ordinary people co-create their experiences and realities. Core
beliefs, experiences, and realities are concentric circles, overlapping and
indistinguishable. For example, race consciousness (a core belief) denies
ordinary people full experiences, and at the same, it co-creates what they
seek to avoid. Yet, race consciousness is simply a mind construct. In this
Article, race consciousness constitutes a belief (or a mind construct) that
encourages ordinary people to point accusatory fingers at white racism, an
emotional balm for that which naturally flows from their feelings,
imaginations, and actions.
Part I lays out the framework of Practice and Praxis, illustrating how
these frameworks link themselves to a central feature of CRT—structural
determinism. Part II critiques CRT’s mindset doctrine and “naming our
own reality,”41 arguing that they are corollaries of structural determinism.
Part III presents an incomplete model for a pure consciousness theory of
human agency, an approach that conjoins pure consciousness, conscious
mind (inner and outer ego), and co-creative principles as powerful elements
in the co-creation of a range of personal experiences and social realities.
These elements suggest a new model for agency, bypassing the liberal
notion of a negated subject and, by implication, the victim’s theory of
ordinary people who suffer apparent external, objective structural forces.
In this tentative model, nothing exists outside of the individual self or
collective selves. CRT embraces a liberal idea of human subjectivity, and
so Race Crits cannot liberate anyone from so-called oppressive
experiences. Nevertheless, I should point out that ordinary people, relying
on a pure consciousness theory of agency, can choose what personal
experiences and social realities they would like to co-create, thus reminding
them that they are human gods who simply play the role of victims.

41. See Richard Delgado, When A Story Is Just A Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76
VA. L. REV. 95, 111 n.1 (1990) (establishing that “naming our own reality” is a basic theme
of Critical Race scholarship as feminists and scholars of color draw attention to the role of
voice in legal scholarship).
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I. CRITICAL RACE PRACTICE/PRAXIS: AN ANTISUBORDINATION
FRAMEWORK FOR SUBTEXTUAL VICTIMS OF WHITE STRUCTURAL
OPPRESSION
A. Introduction
Practice and Praxis proffer antisubordination practices for subtextual
victims of white structural oppression (e.g., white racism). Under these
practices, Williams and Yamamoto confer great power on structural
forces.42 Yamamoto posits that structural shifts explain how and why
Structural shifts displace and
minorities need political lawyers.43
disempower ordinary people, and through powerful agents like political
lawyers, Williams and Yamamoto state that ordinary people can learn to
engage in antisubordination practices.44
Whether stable or shifting, structures and ordinary people work together
dualistically. Broadly speaking, structural shifts evidence changing human
activities and values. Changes can be welcomed or otherwise, positive or
negative. Regardless, structure has no life without human activities.
Structural shifts are not objective, external forces that work against
ordinary people. For example, the Civil War qualifies as a structural shift.
Supported by historical ambivalence, ordinary people simply confronted
their activities and values. For better or worse, ordinary people simply
encountered themselves. Although politicians expressed it in social and
political terms, a history of human ambivalence about American slavery
gave rise to this War. Like the Civil War, changing racial attitudes, social
values, and political interest also qualify as structural shifts, and these
attitudes flow from us.45
Structure matters. What matters more, literally more, is the conscious
mind. The conscious mind (e.g., race consciousness) has a social life, and
it is through our day-to-day practices that ordinary people experience the
result of the conscious mind as an apparently tangible, external, and
objective reality. Yet, it is a virtual one, shifting when a critical mass of

42. See generally Williams, Jr., supra note 17 (discussing the ways in which the
structure of law school education excludes and trivializes minority contributions);
Yamamoto, supra note 18 (highlighting the ways in which the structure of the legal system
fails to serve minority communities).
43. See Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 830-39 (discussing the disconnectedness of
progressive race theory and political lawyering practice).
44. See Williams, Jr., supra note 17, at 765 (encouraging law students and professors to
bring CRT into their practice of law); Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 827 (discussing the
general state of disconnect between race theory and practical lawyering).
45. ROBERTS, supra note 37, at 68. See generally ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A
PRIVILEGED CLASS 76-82 (1993) (exploring the issues and barriers facing educated blacks
because of individual beliefs and attitudes and despite legal and policy change).
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ordinary people changes their core beliefs.46 How we use language, and
how we allow it to use us,47 reinforces beliefs and other engines of reality
creation. For example, the Ho conflict came into sharp relief when each
side expressed their views.48 Language reveals beliefs and these beliefs
drove the Ho litigation. Rather than analyze this language, Yamamoto
prefers to see the interracial conflict as structurally determined.49 For
ordinary people, structural properties are social realities. If this conflict
serves as a blank structural canvas,50 Asians and blacks have painted their
ideas of who ought to benefit from these remedies. Structure can be the
hard edges of the canvas, but human hands built it. In this way, structure
works intimately with the conscious mind and human activities (e.g., race
consciousness). It cannot be otherwise.
Williams and Yamamoto confer too much power on structural forces,
thus relegating ordinary people to mere witnesses to history.51 In effect,
they negate ordinary people’s subjectivity.
Yet, through their
antisubordination practices, they purport to cope with these forces by
giving us a classic, yet banal tale of “structure” versus “agency.” With a
blend of modernist hope and postmodernist surgery, they tell us that
negated subjects can reclaim themselves.

46. See Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 131
(1984) (positing that consciousness is a collective, rather than an autonomous, concept that
can change over time).
47. See id. at 134-35 (explaining that language is merely a collection of usages that
accompany social change).
48. See Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 965 F. Supp. 1316, 1316 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (challenging the validity of a judicial consent decree desegregating San Francisco’s
public schools). The decree stated that no fewer than four ethnic or racial groups had to be
represented in the schools’ student body, “with no racial/ethnic group permitted to constitute
more than 45% of any school’s total enrollment.” Id. The plaintiffs applied for admission
and were rejected because the particular schools had already reached a maximum enrollment
for their ethnicity. Id. They sued, claiming that the policy unfairly discriminated against
them. Id. See also INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 29-30 (stating that the ChineseAmerican plaintiffs in Ho wanted to be excluded from the consent decree’s forty percent cap
on minority enrollment in a school, claiming that it unfairly promoted Hispanic and AfricanAmerican students with lower test scores than the Chinese-American children).
49. See Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 821-27 (discussing the interracial dynamics of Ho
and yet failing to analyze critically the individual and collective core beliefs that brought
these groups into legal conflict).
50. See ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 39 (“When you arrive, or emerge, into physical life,
not only is your mind not a blank slate, waiting for the scrolls that experience will write
upon it, but you are already equipped with a memory bank far surpassing that of any
computer.”).
51. See KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 19 (Terrell
Carver trans.), reprinted in MARX’S ‘EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE’:
(POST)MODERN
INTERPRETATIONS 19 (Mark Cowling & James Martin eds., 2002) (stating that “men make
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in circumstances they choose
for themselves”).
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B. What is Critical Race Practice?
For Williams, Practice serves clients. It teaches students to serve clients
too. He writes: “Teaching is a vital part of translating CRT into practice.
It’s the students, stupid.”52 He continues: “They’re future practitioners
who won’t have a whole lot of time to read law review articles on critical
race theory when they get out into the real world. Better give it to them
now, in meaningful doses.”53 Practice focuses on ordinary people and their
communities, on helping and empowering them.54
In preparing to earn law degrees, students should learn applied ways to
empower ordinary people and redress conflicts. Without applied ways, left
scholars expect this level of engagement, even though they have given
students no practice at listening and doing. With applied tools gained while
students actually have the interest and time, Race Crits can achieve at least
three goals: reorient themselves to practice, develop a client-centered
analysis of racism, and bridge the gap between ivory tower thinkers and
trench-oriented lawyers.
In the clinical program, CRT’s important themes organize the student
projects. That is, a bottom-up perspective drives the projects, in which left
scholars teach students to listen seriously to concerns, priorities, and
experiences of indigenous people, whether they live on a Navajo
Reservation or in Nicaragua.55 The projects reify indigenous rights by
decolonizing American and international law, and left scholars encourage
students to learn how current legal doctrine causes colonialism and racism.
In the clinic, they strategize to weaken this doctrine and to develop and test
new legal theories.56
For Williams’ Tribal Law Clinic, Practice immerses students in
“important aspects of critical race theory.”57 Teachers “globalize and
historicize” social and legal problems.58 They teach “the nature and
meaning of the historic struggle of indigenous peoples.”59 They orient
students as to how tribal courts express an applied tribal vision. They
52. Williams, Jr., supra note 17, at 761.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 761-63 (discussing how being involved in community activities enriches the
experience of being a law professor).
55. Id. at 762-63; see also Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (stating that, by
understanding the perspectives of those who have experienced discrimination, scholars can
better understand law and justice).
56. Williams, Jr., supra note 17, at 763; see INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 128
(discussing Robert Williams, Jr.’s call for a critical race practice because he felt that law
professors working on progressive theory had become too distanced from actual law-based
practice).
57. Williams, Jr., supra note 17, at 763.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 763-64.
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sensitize students to the duty they owe to the community, as “invited
participant[s] in an important human rights struggle to reverse the history
of ethnocide and genocide.”60 After these instructions, teachers train law
students to listen, to become sensitive to the client’s subject position,61 to
see the world through the client’s eyes, and to appreciate how a client’s
narratives reveal her values.62
Listening promotes value-learning. “[W]e train students next to listen
seriously to the stories that American American Indian people tell about
this issue [of tearing generations of children from American American
Indian homes and culture],” Williams writes.63 By listening, students get
cultural sensitivity training led by tribal elders and social workers who talk
about traditional values, culture, beliefs, and practices.64 Teachers and
students, for example, discuss child rearing and how the tribe applies the
best interest of the child test.65 To buttress this value learning, students
learn from tribal legends and stories that teach values through
storytelling.66
By appreciating values through cultural sensitivity training, students
learn from the bottom up. Thereafter, they investigate cases on the
reservation by first collecting the parties’ relevant stories: “the child’s
story, the parents’, social workers’, probation officers’, relatives’,
neighbors’, victims’, whatever.”67 By making them “story hearing fools,”68
students learn and then later share what they have learned with others.
Now they can work toward a fair result. Williams’ point appears clear:
through clinical legal education, students learn that solutions exist within
American American Indian narratives if they listen to those at the bottom.69

60. Id. at 764.
61. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law
and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1258, 1281 (1992) (arguing that empathic fallacy illustrates that “our ability to escape the
confines of our own preconceptions is quite limited . . . . The notion of ideas competing with
each other, with truth and goodness emerging victorious from the competition, has proven
seriously deficient when applied to evils, like racism, that are deeply inscribed in the
culture.”).
62. See ART BERMAN, FROM THE NEW CRITICISM TO DECONSTRUCTION: THE RECEPTION
OF STRUCTURALISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM 124-28 (1988) (arguing that narratives suffer
the fate of structuralism).
63. Williams, Jr., supra note 17, at 764.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. (stating that this process teaches students to examine clients’ stories and to
see how they matter in the context of a multicultural world and legal system).
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C. What is Critical Race Praxis?
For Eric Yamamoto, Praxis means “racial justice as antisubordination
practice.”70 It requires left scholars to engage in actual community
struggles against white structural oppression. Antisubordination practice is
a “jurisprudence of reconstruction,”71 and in blending modernism and
postmodernism, Yamamoto puts critical inquiry and pragmatism into
antiracism practice. That is, he suggests using actual experiences to rework
theory.72 His approach leads to two duties. First, by translating theory into
actual experience, left scholars can engage in direct action against racism.73
Second, once presented with these practical tools, political lawyers and
community activists must attend to how critical thinkers define race, how
society understands civil rights, and why law serves elite interests.74 By
meeting these duties, the consortium can critically reframe and legally
engage “racialized practices,”75 in areas such as corporate and immigration
law.76
1.

Critical race praxis’ definition
Praxis blends critical, practical, sociological, and legal analysis with
political lawyers and community activists who seek realized justice for
communities of ordinary people.77 By critical, Yamamoto means theory.
By practical, he suggests useful.78 By sociological, he hints at how we
have organized society. By legal analysis, he looks to problem-solving
legal rules.79 Specifically, Praxis means “racial justice as antisubordination
practice.”80 For this central idea, Yamamoto draws on Paulo Freire’s
“antisubordination action with reflection.”81

70. INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 129.
71. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 741, 744 (1994) (referring to CRT as a jurisprudence of reconstruction and positing
that CRT is successful because it recognizes the tension between modernist and
postmodernist narratives).
72. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 874.
73. Id. See also YAMAMOTO, supra note 39, at 129.
74. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 874.
75. Id. at 874-75.
76. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” As We Know It?: Immigration
and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1481, 1491 (2002)
(discussing critical scholarship and its implications for civil rights in immigration law and
contending that civil rights laws must change to accommodate increasing rates of marriage);
Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty
of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 389 (2002) (exploring racism in
corporate law settings and suggesting ways to assist corporate managers in conforming to
laws prohibiting racial discrimination).
77. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 875.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 875 n.249.
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Given Freire’s influence, Praxis structures the practice of justice. This
structure has four principle components. First, Praxis embraces justice as a
process (e.g., method) and as a custom (e.g., norm). As a process,
Yamamoto invokes Freire’s schema: “experience-rethinking-translationengagement.”82 As a custom, Praxis tackles antisubordination and rectifies
injustice. Accordingly, Praxis’ first component directs the consortium to
cope with a client’s grievance (e.g., a conflict between a Korean merchant
and black customer83) by also probing for structural forces behind the
grievance.84
Second, Praxis requires the consortium to use theoretical frameworks to
accomplish several goals: cross-examine the grievance’s subtext; learn
how the grievance flows from culturally disabling representations;
appreciate how this subtext and representation fuel grievances; and assess
critically how institutional justice works in a particular social setting.
Institutional justice may impose limits on the first principle, or it may hold
promise for tackling subordination and for rectifying injustice.85
Third, Praxis encourages the consortium to apply their experiences to
real problems by sharing practical solutions in accessible language with
ordinary people who wish to end the grievance. Fourth and finally, Praxis
requires the consortium to critique what justice means in the setting out of
which the grievance arose, so that it can “heal disabling intergroup
wounds” and build “intergroup alliances.”86
2.

Critical race praxis’ framework
Praxis is a provisional framework. At the beginning, the consortium
starts with four points: the conceptual, the performative, the material, and
the reflexive.87 These inquiries do not operate like “a universal theory of
justice, nor do they prescribe what racial justice is, or should be, in any
particular situation.”88
Rather, they assist others to forge “right
relationships,” thus serving as “guideposts toward collective, reflective
antisubordination practice.”89
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Reginald Leamon Robinson, “The Other Against Itself”: Understanding
the Violence Discourse Between Korean-African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15, 36-40
(1993) (exploring the racial and legal roots that led to violence in the case of People v. Soon
Ja Du, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), in which a Korean grocer shot a black
teenager over an alleged incident of shoplifting).
84. See Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 876 (exploring the need to look deeply at the
cultural forces that may impact the issues of the case).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 877-78.
88. Id. at 878; see also Harris, supra note 71, at 745 (discussing the impossibility of
developing a complete CRT).
89. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 878.
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The conceptual inquiry

This inquiry translates and analyzes high theory. The consortium does
so in response to an interracial grievance or a legal dispute.90 In Interracial
Justice, the street fight between the Nguyens and Narcisse escalates into
broad structural claims made by blacks against a Vietnamese grocer.91 In
this conflict, the consortium examines why the parties have racialized a
street fight, and how this grievance links itself to “heterosexism, patriarchy,
and class.”92 By identifying these structural forces, the consortium also
critiques the political economy.93 This critique conceptualizes the
conflict—its particulars (e.g., the fight) and its context (e.g., white
racism).94
With this conceptualization, the consortium examines the claims that
emerge from a controversy. Are the claims a “traditional source[] of
authority”?95 Are the claims supported by evidence?96 What remedies the
claim?97 By answering these questions, the consortium engages in an
“ordinary investigation of a legal claim.”98 Relying on a socio-legal
analysis, they must take two additional steps. First, they must review the
judicial setting of the conflict.99 Second, they must recognize large legal
issues that may motivate specific claims.100
After these steps, the consortium assesses the claim. Can the consortium
remedy the claim despite the way the conflicting groups have constructed
it? The consortium also identifies larger, structural forces that drive the
grievance.101 With these forces noted, the consortium dislodges embedded
90. Id.; see, e.g., Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 965 F. Supp. 1316, 1327
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that Chinese American students had not been unconstitutionally
discriminated against despite their being denied enrollment in a public school because of
their race).
91. See INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 1-6 (discussing the interracial group
conflict between the Nguyens, a Vietnamese family, and Ulysses Narcisse, a black man, that
led to a boycott of the Nguyen’s store by blacks).
92. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 878.
93. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474
(1897) (recommending that if lawyers wish to understand (e.g., predict) the complex content
out of which judges make legal decisions about social ends, then they should study
philosophy and political economy).
94. See Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 878 (providing other examples of context,
including heterosexism and class).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 878-79.
100. Id.
101. See INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 1-6 (discussing the tense relations
between African American and Vietnamese residents in a New Orleans community,
including the failed attempts at mediation after African American residents boycotted a
Vietnamese grocery store and attempted to drive the owners out of the neighborhood); see
also People v. Soon Ja Du, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (highlighting that a

ROBINSON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

1/17/2005 11:23:13 AM

ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL RACE PRACTICE/PRAXIS

1377

and externally derived structural perceptions.102 In the Nguyen conflict, the
Neighborhood Committee for Justice organized a boycott, and after the
media criticized blacks for the economic stranglehold, one person said: “It
is clear that some groups just arriving in America see us as the bottom of
the pecking order and intend to use us as stepping stones to their own
prosperity.”103 This ordinary person has core beliefs that regard blacks as
an underclass and believe immigrants exploit this underclass.104
Yamamoto’s two-step process purportedly unearths deeper, darker beliefs
(e.g., false consciousness) that drive interracial conflicts, and the
consortium can develop an “operational language” so that, through agency,
ordinary people can redress problems and form alliances.105
b.

The performative inquiry

Performative inquiry is at least a two-part action. First, advocates must
ask “what.” Second, they must ask “who.” Under the “what” inquiry, the
consortium must identify the “practical” steps that not only respond to
specific claims but also redress a claim’s subtext. This subtext possesses
structural features: “disparaging cultural images” and “exercises of group
power.” More than likely, these structural features amp up “historical
group grievances.”
With respect to the Nguyen conflict, according to Yamamoto, the violent
fight between Nguyen’s son and Narcisse had a very specific context, one
that stood above historical tensions between different racial groups.106
Each group would hold culturally-derived images of the other.107 Seizing
upon this fight, the Neighborhood Committee for Justice declared that the
community it represented lacked real power.108 To garner this power, the
Neighborhood Committee for Justice sought to oust the Nguyen family.109
Korean woman who shot an African American girl failed to demonstrate her remorse
because of cultural barriers).
102. See Harris, supra note 71, at 743 (stating that “[racism] is deeply embedded in
language, perceptions, and perhaps even ‘reason’ itself”).
103. See INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 3-4 (citing Muhammad Yungal, Blacks
Still Seek Empowerment, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 30, 1996, at B6).
104. INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 3.
105. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 879.
106. See INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 5 (explaining that interracial tensions
derived from slavery, Jim Crow laws, white racism, poverty, and violence in both the
African American and Vietnamese communities).
107. See id. at 3 (reporting that African Americans viewed Asian foreigners as exploiters
and that the Vietnamese saw African Americans as stifling their opportunity for equal
economic treatment).
108. See id. at 2 (reporting the comments of a Committee for Justice spokesperson: “It’s
time to reclaim the community from a stream of foreigners who invade a neighborhood and
bleed it of money.”). See generally MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE, supra note 40, at 2-6
(discussing exaggerated stories that blacks tell so that they can reinforce victimhood).
109. See INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 1 (describing that the Neighborhood
Committee for Justice distributed fliers accusing the Nguyens of discrimination and verbal

ROBINSON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1378

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/17/2005 11:23:13 AM

[Vol. 53:1361

Refusing mediation with the Human Relations Commission out of distrust,
it declared: “[o]ur plan is to drive this mean spirited grocer out of our
community, if necessary penniless.”110 And so in addressing the “what,”
the consortium must use what it has learned to engage in a socio-legal
analysis, and in so doing, the consortium can dismantle “subordinating
social structures and . . . rectify injustice.”111
Under the “who” inquiry, the consortium must decide “who” should act.
Presumptively, in interracial group conflict, progressive lawyers and
activists should play vital roles. Left scholars can play a role, but if and
only if they translate their abstract analyses into workable tools, so that
they have a practical effect in “frontline antisubordination practice.”112
Once engaged, left scholars can appreciate first-hand that antisubordination
practice harbors difficult, complex, and unstable realities.
In the Nguyen conflict, left scholars can help contending groups realize
that they vie with each other because the dominant society has not only
constructed but also poured damaging stereotypes, images, and narratives
into their heads and their communities. As a result, left scholars can
redress the latent distrust between blacks and Vietnamese. Until left
scholars place their work in the service of antisubordination practice,
political lawyers and community activists cannot develop real, practical
analyses of interracial conflicts. By staying in the Ivory tower and by
publishing inaccessible critiques of white racism, community stakeholders
cannot begin to develop different ways of coping with structural forces, and
without these options, racial groups may not produce material changes
within interracial communities.113
c.

The material inquiry

The material and performative inquiries work together. Materiality
refers to stakeholders’ desire to attain redress in interracial group conflict.
Toward this end, this consortium must look into the material conditions
that racial oppression has changed. Change can happen at social,
structural, and representational levels. At the socio-structural level, we
should ask: Can we change how these conflicting racial groups get access
to housing, education, and labor markets? Can we alter how society
redistributes goods and services to these conflicting racial groups? Can we
restructure how these conflicting racial groups work with democratically
abuse).
110. Id. at 2-3.
111. Id.
112. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 880. See generally MAO TSE-TUNG, ON PRACTICE
(1946) (arguing that intellectuals must become involved with the ordinary people so that
they can learn how peasants actually live and work).
113. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 880.
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organized public institutions? At the representational level, we must ask:
What are these conflicting racial groups’ cultural practices (e.g., racial
identities)?
By examining how structural forces have positioned
communities for interracial conflict, we can reassess why these groups
maintained specific cultural practices. In this way, the consortium must
show these groups how structural forces have aided them in developing
racial identities and in constructing identity practices that fuel interracial
conflicts.114
In the Nguyen conflict, a material inquiry interrogates underlying
structural forces.115 The consortium would investigate the extent to which
conflicting racial groups actually have access to resources, and how they
perceive that access.116
It would explore why the Neighborhood
Committee for Justice worked so hard to derail mediation talks by using
incendiary language against Mr. Jackson and the Nguyens. It would
examine why blacks felt victimized by the Vietnamese who had only
recently joined the community. It would look into how different cultural
practices informed the way they experienced each other.117 It would also
study how racial identities (e.g., race consciousness) led to ways of
experiencing white racism. In the end, the interracial group conflict that
followed the street fight may be a proxy for perceptions about access,
cultural practices, and racial identities. If so, the consortium must ask local
stakeholders to take personal responsibility for the way structural forces
have organized their consciousness, molded their identities, and assembled
their experiences. In this way, the consortium has to focus heavily on
structural properties, viewing them as primary causes of interracial
conflicts. For Yamamoto, a material inquiry exposes deeper, structural
issues—narrative discourse.
d.

The reflexive inquiry

Reflective inquiries tie real experiences and practical theories together.
The consortium constructs, deconstructs, and reconstitutes theories,
especially because it has engaged antiracist struggles in which prior
theories and understandings were perhaps ineffective. By keeping its
theories in flux, the consortium can alter the conceptual, performative, and

114. Id.
115. See INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 4 (criticizing the legal proceedings for
failing to understand why African Americans and Vietnamese maintain certain racial beliefs
about each group).
116. See generally IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS:
KOREANS IN LOS ANGELES 1965-1982 178 (1988) (describing how Koreans in Los Angeles
used class and ethnic resources to become successful entrepreneurs).
117. See INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 5 (providing the class structure history
of New Orleans as an example of this type of inquiry).
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material inquiries of Praxis. In the Nguyen conflict, the consortium would
use this inquiry to better understand what they did well and not so well. It
would deconstruct and reconstitute a practical theory to help other racial
groups who contend with each other.
II. CRITICAL RACE THEORY’S METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: MINDSET
DOCTRINE, “NAMING OUR REALITY,” STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM, AND
THEIR IMPACT ON CRITICAL RACE PRACTICE/PRAXIS
A. CRT’s Methodological Framework
Since the late 1980s, Race Crits have increasingly practiced118 a standard
methodology, through which they pursue justice and liberation.119 With
textbooks,120 Race Crits have attempted to settle down what Angela P.
Harris once described as an “eclectic, iconoclastic nature.”121 Nevertheless,
Race Crits still experiment, perhaps encouraging Williams and Yamamoto
to develop their antisubordination practices. In their writings, Race Crits
have adopted modernism (or structuralism), allowing them to place faith in
liberal ideas like rights, justice, and liberty, even though they deconstruct
these legalisms so that they can unearth the truth.122 Writing within this
tension of modernism and postmodernism, these antisubordination
practices suffer from the conceptual limits of this structuralist
methodology,123 one standing on the following themes:
(1) an insistence on “naming our own reality”; (2) the belief that
knowledge and ideas are powerful; (3) a readiness to question basic
premises of moderate/incremental civil rights law; (4) the borrowing of
insights from social science on race and racism; (5) critical examination
of the myths and stories powerful groups use to justify racial
subordination; (6) a more contextualized treatment of doctrine;

118. See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 1835, 1841 (1988) (explaining that legal scholarship is not about “objective
information” or tools to discover this information, but rather, about practice through which
scholars socially construct ways to engage each other).
119. See Harris, supra note 71, at 743 (commenting that “CRT seems confident that
crafting the correct theory of race and racism can help lead to enlightenment, empowerment,
and finally to emancipation: that, indeed, the truth shall set you free”).
120. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (providing articles on CRT scholarship to
highlight the themes and directions scholars have embraced); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2000) (incorporating articles by
young authors who discuss new ways to confront the issues involving race).
121. See Harris, supra note 71, at 744 (explaining that the birth of the CRT movement
witnessed few common methods or beliefs).
122. Id. at 743.
123. Id. at 744 (“The seeming choice between modernism and postmodernism is an
impossible one. The task is to live in the tension itself: to continually rebuild modernism in
light of postmodernist critique.”).
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(7) criticism of liberal legalisms; and (8) an interest in structural
determinism—the ways in which legal tools and thought-structures can
impede law reform.124

Under CRT’s modernist and postmodernist methodology, these themes
divide two categories: (1) macro structuralism and (2) macro individual
agency and social practices. Under macro structuralism, we find “an
interest in structural determinism—the ways in which legal tools and
thought-structures can impede law reform.”125 This feature forms a major
set, within which we find its elements: “a readiness to question basic
premises of moderate/incremental civil rights law;” “a more contextualized
treatment of doctrine;” and “criticism of liberal legalisms.”126 Under macro
individual agency and practices, we find an insistence on “naming our own
reality,” within which we find its elements: “the belief that knowledge and
ideas are powerful;” “the borrowing of insights from social science on race
and racism;” and “critical examination of the myths and stories powerful
groups use to justify racial subordination.”127 Macro structuralism refers to
structural forces. Macro individual agency purports to deconstruct these
forces, suggesting that Race Crits can free themselves from white racism.
Yet, the categories lack efficacy; they never recognize ordinary people as
powerful reality creators, earthly gods who name and thus co-create their
realities.
Believing in rights and questioning how society recognizes these rights,
Race Crits never ask if ordinary people currently name a reality that
reinforces racism, the very experiences and realities against which they
struggle. Rather, Race Crits simply take pity on these people,128 viewing
them as victims of white racism. Out of this view, they work to end white
racism so that ordinary people like blacks can live as “free” blacks. If
liberal society raced them, this mission belies real freedom. Escaping this
tension requires Race Crits to reject a victimization theory, and they must
ask: “what is reality?” Right now, these themes methodologically bracket

124. Delgado, supra note 41, at 95 n.1; see Anthony Paul Farley, Thirteen Stories, 15
TOURO L. REV. 543, 586-88 (1999) (citing to these themes while explaining that he objects
to CRT because it is too interested in a dialogue with racists); Greta McMorris, Critical
Race Theory, Cognitive Psychology, and the Social Meaning of Race: Why Individualism
Will Not Solve Racism, 67 UMKC L. REV. 695, 698-700 (1999) (identifying several themes
of critical race scholarship, culminating into three distinct arguments).
125. Delgado, supra note 41, at 95 n.1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Alan Wolfe, Hidden Injuries: Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image
of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 7, 1997, at 31, 32
(book review) (arguing that liberal theories of racial damage have been used to foster pity
rather than unity among races and stating that, “And pity, even when it is well-intentioned,
is never far from contempt.”).
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Race Crits; they stunt them epistemologically.129 By relying on these
methodological themes, Race Crits can only imagine ordinary people as
negated subjects victimized and dominated by white society.
Can these ordinary people name their own reality? This question
confesses another methodological contradiction. Race Crits like Williams
and Yamamoto argue that structural forces rob ordinary people of their
right to live as relatively unmediated citizens. These forces emit spiritmurdering stories that infect ordinary people. Whites consume these
stories too, which convince them that worthy citizens benefit in a liberal
society. If society mesmerizes ordinary people with these stories, are the
authors immune? Using postmodernist tools, how do we remember our
unmediated selves so that we can effectively violate these stories? Under
structuralism, ordinary people cannot truly remember this Self, so on what
source can ordinary people rely to name their own reality that helps recall
that they have always been earthly gods? None. Ordinary people live as
ever-questioning victims who are heartlessly mocked by liberal legalisms
like Justice. By declaring that society mocks them and denies them Justice,
ordinary people have effectively boiled their stories down to an oft-told sad
tale of “structure” versus “agency,” in a term: structural determinism.
B. Structural Determinism
As an antisubordination practice, Williams’ Practice and Yamamoto’s
Praxis grow out of structural determinism. For didactic purposes, I divide
this sociological concept into two parts: structuralism and determinism.
Structuralism130 directly links “words” and “reality.”131 It relates things to
things. Speaker A talks of things, and even if ordinary people, the listeners,
cannot actually “observe” these things, they become accustomed to
experiencing the things as real, external forces.132 Speaker A reveals how
society’s underlying structure shapes an individual’s experience or group’s
life.133 For Race Crits, an unseen thing like white racism limits and
constrains how people believe, think, feel, and act.134
129. I discuss these limitations in my working paper entitled “The Death of the Race
Crit: Deconstructing Critical Race Theory and the End of Race Consciousness”
(forthcoming 2004). I delivered this paper at the Law and Society Conference, in British
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada on June 2-5, 2002. I chaired a panel that focused on race
consciousness and that included Professors Tanya Kateri Hernandez (Rutgers-Newark) and
R. Richard Banks (Stanford).
130. See BERMAN, supra note 62, at 114-17 (discussing the features of structuralism as a
theory, a method of language, and an interpretation).
131. See ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 315 (2d ed.
2000) (describing structuralism as a view of language that recognizes a relationship between
words and what words represent).
132. BERMAN, supra note 62, at 114-17.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Determinism states that a clear, narrow set of factors cause social events
in a relatively predictable way.135 Broadly speaking, determinism is any
theory, like CRT, that explains the world (e.g., white racism) by definable
factors.136 This approach negates a host of other factors, including human
agency.137 As such, Race Crits can argue against the relative autonomy of
ordinary people like blacks so that they can pursue other political ends. By
so doing, Race Crits can say that things (or a set of things) cause ordinary
people to be subtextual victims, thus explaining the moment-to-moment
existence of, say, the black community. If these things victimize ordinary
people, it follows that ordinary people lack meaningful human agency. In
this way, determinism becomes a reductionist model, emphasizing a limited
range of causal social factors that explains why ordinary people like
Mexicans suffer racism and racial discrimination.138
And so within the concept of structural determinism, Race Crits state
that they “focus on ways in which the entire structure of legal thought, or at
least of major doctrines like the First Amendment, influences its content,
always tending toward maintaining the status quo.”139 Delgado and
Stefancic go on to say that “once we understand how our categories, tools,
and doctrines influence us, we may escape their sway and work more
effectively for liberation.”140 That is, structural determinism represents a
“[c]oncept that a mode of thought or widely shared practice determines
significant social outcomes, usually without our conscious knowledge.”141
Yet, despite these determining factors, Delgado, like Williams and
Yamamoto, suggests that the buried, negated subject will rise to act.
Structural determinism informs not only CRT but also Practice and
Praxis, in which the negated subject has only the power to identify
structural forces that explain American Indian oppression and interracial
conflicts. For example, Yamamoto declares that blacks can be victims and
victimizers.142 If they victimize, can they have agency? More broadly,
does such victimizing of victims presuppose that blacks have always had
agency, a kind of purposeful human action that sits astride core beliefs?
Did Yamamoto mean that at the “borderland[s]”143 blacks operate on false
consciousness, a racist implant that destroys the respect and self-restraint
they would otherwise express toward other blacks? Acting as duress, this
135. Id. at 84.
136. Id. at 84-85.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 120, at 205.
140. Id.
141. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
155-56 (2001).
142. INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 100-01.
143. Id. at 101.
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implant prevents him from forming the criminal mind and volitional will to
act criminally against other blacks. Should they be free from state
prosecution? The mindset doctrine works seamlessly with structural
determinism, thus suggesting that ordinary people cannot likewise name
their own reality without reifying dominant values.
Accordingly,
Yamamoto insists that in the material inquiry, the consortium must reassess
group cultural traits and re-articulate racial identities and relationships.144
This reassessment and re-articulation vet structural forces like misogyny
that turn black men against their lovers.145
1. Macro structuralism
In light of my critique, macro structuralism and macro individual agency
and practices share common functions. Each major set reveals the degree
to which white structural oppression works against ordinary people. Race
Crits appear to use these themes to unearth invisible, deeply encrusted
forms of structural injustice.146 These hidden forms permit whites to
control ordinary people and men to dominate women.
By deconstructing elite white narratives, Race Crits must believe that a
payoff exists. The payoff must be white guilt, consciousness raising, or the
end of white oppression.147 This exposé should make visible the invisible
privilege that whites unjustifiably enjoy,148 and with real, sober analysis,149
elite whites will suffer regime changing remorse. Feeling badly, they will
condemn themselves as evil, greedy people. With heavy hearts and
grieving minds, they will become better people. If CRT’s political game is
white guilt and black innocence, Race Crits cannot now surgically destroy
the mindsets of ordinary people, implying that it is a locus for co-creating
their personal experiences of white racism. From CRT’s structural
144. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 880.
145. Id.
146. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 41-42 (1990)
(“The systemic character of oppression implies that an oppressed group need not have a
correlate oppressing group. While structural oppression involves relations among groups,
these relations do not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression of one
group by another.”). By implication, Young argues that people have agency, unbeknownst
to them, and the power to reproduce oppression in their lives as well as in others. Id. These
people could be black, Latinos, American Indians, Asians, poor, gay, lesbian, or women. Id.
at 42.
147. See Roy Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposal Structure and Application of
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 91 (1994), reprinted in DOROTHY A.
BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 2, 7 (2003) (“CRT
also seeks to raise the consciousness of people of color and whites alike.”).
148. See generally Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”: White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 961
(1993) (arguing that the idea race consciousness should address “whites consciousness of
whiteness” instead of the principle of colorblindness).
149. See Brooks, supra note 147, at 95 (stating that CRT attempts to raise consciousness
“by grounding its analysis on the real, everyday experiences of people of color”).
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determinism perspective, ordinary people are simple, empty-headed sheep.
Like other liberal subjects, ordinary people, having consumed ideas about
limited autonomy, not only serve themselves up as meat for their keepers,
but also fall easy prey to systemic predators. To this extent, Race Crits are
academic priests who hope to redeem, not ordinary people who cannot
control the next moments in their lives, but white elites who have structureshaping agency. CRT’s religious movement discounts ordinary people,
seeking not to empower them, but to destroy white narratives, so that
ordinary people like blacks can become the unabashedly raced people their
parents train them to be!150
Specifically, macro structuralism focuses on white structural oppression
and how dominant narratives impact ordinary people. Let’s consider public
education. Blacks have struggled to educate their children and to break
down artificial barriers to formal education.151 Yet, during slavery and Jim
Crow, blacks were educated, and they excelled academically. Do slavery
and Jim Crow politics explain how ordinary people like blacks perform
academically? If so, Race Crits must identify the specific historic markers
that prevent ordinary people from academic excellence. If not, Race Crits
must identify multiple factors, including parental role models, that perforce
impact school-age children.152 As such, structural forces alone cannot
explain why blacks do not excel academically. By examining other factors,
Race Crits would have to consider cultural practices, core beliefs, and
emotions, including the power of thought.153 This approach subjects
ordinary people to attack, perhaps condemnation. Yet, if Race Crits give
ordinary people like blacks a pass, thus suggesting that their core beliefs
cannot govern academic performance, then they must blame structural
forces. They must look to “out there” forces—the power elite and white
oppressors.

150. See ROBERTS, supra note 45, at 57 (stating that the reality in which children believe
is that which their parents understand).
151. See generally Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 198, 198-201 (1850)
(describing how a black child, who was denied entrance into a public school for white
children, sued to recover damages against the city).
152. See JAMES A. BEANE & RICHARD P. LIPKA, SELF-CONCEPT, SELF-ESTEEM, AND THE
CURRICULUM 18 (1984) (“Educators who work with young children are well aware that
when children first come to school they already have feelings and beliefs about themselves
in terms of adequacy and competency. . . . In other words, from the very first experiences in
life, young children begin to develop a sense of themselves.”).
153. Blacks share core beliefs that may prove detrimental to the progressive success of
their communities. See Julian Bond, ‘Blackness’ Is a Phony Issue, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,
2002, at B7 (discussing the “black enough” belief and stating, “The degree of their
‘blackness’ isn’t measurable—or relevant. There are no DNA tests for that.”).
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In this way, structural determinism is a proxy for mindsets.154 It shapes
and contours everything, displacing agency so that ordinary people serve
ends beyond their known intentions. To bracket this liberal project, Race
Crits convince themselves that they can discern the way language, culture,
and practices operate against ordinary people and the public interest.
Invariably, Race Crits start with slavery and Jim Crow politics. Proceeding
linearly to the present, they question whether extant laws can cope with a
history of racial discrimination. Logic thus mandates that slavery and Jim
Crow must explain why ordinary people like blacks simply cannot keep up.
Within the present effects of past discrimination, ordinary people and how
they co-create are cast aside so that Race Crits can simply and gratuitously
blame structural forces.
In addition to his indictment of structural forces, Charles Lawrence
posited correctly that racism affects all of us,155 and in the context of his
argument about unconscious racism and cultural meaning, he asked us and
the courts to focus not on intent but on effects.156 In a complex way,
Lawrence found a compelling argument so that we could broadly
understand how racism worked in Freudian and cognitive ways.157
Whether whites liked it or wished to acknowledge their racial prejudice,158
society experienced their repressed or unconscious racial ruinations as
effects that, if all else failed, we could explain through a cultural meanings
test.159 Should Lawrence’s insights apply to ordinary people like blacks?
Like whites, ordinary people have consumed self-annihilating discourse,
and at deep, unacknowledged levels, this discourse like any effective
mindset produced effects in black life. Even in the absence of whites,
blacks would fulfill latent prophecies. Are blacks different from whites?
Human beings can hold powerful narratives that undermine their efficacy at
junctures where they may feel especially vulnerable. By lifting Lawrence’s
insight beyond a straight-forward structuralist critique of white racism,
Race Crits can examine ordinary people as well as structural forces.
154. See Heller, supra note 46, at 142 (stating that “structuralism in general consistently
involves the reduction of apparently multiple and independent practices —the analogues of
words—to elements within an ordered system”).
155. See Lawrence, supra note 13, at 322 (suggesting that our cultural belief system
makes us all racists and that we do not recognize when that system manifests itself in our
actions).
156. Id. at 323.
157. See id. at 322-23 (explaining that Freudian theory provides that the human mind
suppresses those ideas that conflict with what the individual has learned is right to protect
itself from feeling guilty and defining the theory of cognitive psychology as one in which
certain beliefs “are so much a part of the culture” that “they seem to be part of the
individual’s rational ordering of her perceptions of the world”).
158. See id. at 323 (asserting that, based on Freudian theory, people often suppress
racism from their consciousness when confronted with racist ideas that conflict with societal
beliefs condemning those racist ideas).
159. Id.
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In this way, CRT’s macro structuralism rejects any meaningful link
between white structural oppression and ordinary peoples’ core beliefs.
Only through positing that liberal consciousness and white racism construct
interracial conflicts can macro structuralism account for the Neighborhood
Committee for Justice’s crusade against the Nguyens,160 and the Ho
litigation which tried to grant Asian students greater access to the San
Francisco Unified School District.161 Race Crits can eradicate these
conflicts by getting ordinary people to appreciate the power of American
Indian value-based narratives and to reassess and rearticulate an identity
that allows ordinary people to peel the fog-inducing substances from their
liberal brains. By implication, Race Crits, like Williams and Yamamoto,
tell us that mindsets negate a subject who can name a reality that embraces
values and that ends interracial conflicts. By identifying structural forces,
by destroying mindsets, and by permitting ordinary people to name their
reality, they can project the legitimacy of their core beliefs out into the
world. These core beliefs are values on which ordinary people would
otherwise have relied, in the absence of white racism. Expose white racism
for what it does to ordinary people. Thereafter, they can restore valueteaching narratives of American Indians to their rightful place, and they
will have an antidote to interracial conflicts.
2.

Macro individual agency and social practices
Like macro structuralism, macro individual agency and social practices
suffer the same conceptual limitations. Delgado argued that the “entire
structure of legal thought . . . influences [the law’s] content.”162 In this
vein, Peter Irons writes that “[w]ith Congress, the White House, and the
Supreme Court under the firm corporate control, groups like blacks,
workers, and women had little voice in government.”163 In 1895, a New
York banker toasted powerful white agents, who used their institutional
positions to dictate the content of law: “I give you, gentlemen, the
Supreme Court of the United States—guardian of the dollar, defender of
private property, enemy of spoliation, sheet anchor of the Republic.”164

160. INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 1-6.
161. Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 821-27.
162. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 120, at 213; see Girardeau
A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 2008 (1990) (observing that the design of
the Supreme Court impedes minority efforts to promote social change).
163. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 221 (1999).
164. Id. at 221-22.
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Yet, what about Buchanan v. Warley,165 Shelley v. Kramer,166 and
Barrows v. Jackson?167 Were they just evidence of Bell’s interest
convergence thesis?168 In these cases, the state protected white interest, and
incidentally conferred a benefit on ordinary people.169 Therefore, apart
from these rulings, ordinary people like blacks simply remain victims and
lack any real power to alter white structural oppression. As such, these
rulings fail to create structural spaces in which ordinary people can begin to
assert their agency. Rather, these rulings promote new social practices,
altering only slightly the ways structural forces actually work.
C. Mindset Doctrine
In CRT, Race Crits rely heavily on the mindset doctrine to analyze and
deconstruct how liberal legalism, like Equal Protection, and structural
determinants, like rights, affect ordinary people. Mindset is a “bundle of
presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a
background of which legal and political discourse takes place.”170 For
Race Crits, these stories, parables, narratives, and practices form a shared
reality to make white elite rule natural and normal.171 A mindset prevents
ordinary people from subverting elite realities, and so it becomes natural
and normal for the lazy, undeserving poor to live at the bottom. With a
shared reality, mindsets “build consensus, a common culture of shared
understandings, and a deeper, more vital ethics.”172 In short, elite whites
exist naturally on top, ordinary people at the bottom.173

165. 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (finding unconstitutional a city ordinance that forbade colored
persons from purchasing houses in blocks where the greater number of the houses were
occupied by white persons).
166. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that private agreements to exclude persons of designated
race or color from the ownership or occupancy of residential property did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment when enforced privately while agreements involving state action
did violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
167. 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (deciding that a state court’s action of sanctioning a racially
restrictive covenant is a state action that violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
168. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 519 (1980) (advancing that the interests of blacks and
whites converged when Brown v. Board of Education was decided, and thus, allowed the
decision for desegregation).
169. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81 (denouncing a city ordinance that annulled the right
of a white man to dispose of his property to a person of color and incidentally protecting the
right of a person of color to purchase or sell property to a white person).
170. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 64, 61 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 2000).
171. See id. at 60 (discussing how both the dominant group and the outgroups (ordinary
people) create stories). The outgroup writes stories whose goal is to challenge the white
elite status, while the dominant group writes stories that justify its superiority. Id.
172. See id. at 61 (noting that stories can also reveal that certain beliefs are “ridiculous,
self-serving, or cruel”).
173. Id.
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Within CRT, mindsets operate nearly invisibly, becoming sunglasses
that ordinary people habitually wear.174 Day or night, they allow these
shades to soften the practices on which they focus. They simply forget that
mindsets are there, each using the other. Everyone consumes this deadly,
mind-numbing experience.175 With this very staid, structuralist view, Race
Crits know that mindsets like white structural oppression can influence
how and why ordinary people, like Latinos and Asian Americans, have
experienced America as they have.176
Now, I will proffer an unorthodox view. Ordinary people use mindsets
to “scan” and “interpret” their realities. Race Crits like Delgado, Williams,
and Yamamoto do not critique what “scan” and “interpret” mean. “Scan”
and “interpret” are active, co-creative tasks that construct experiences and
realities. As such, ordinary people like blacks are not simple, emptyheaded pawns, or playthings for a structuralist agenda. If so, Race Crits
quietly confess that ordinary people, like Latinos, construct reality just as
whites do.177 Elite whites and ordinary people construct experiences and
realities, suggesting that by scanning and interpreting, we co-create the
structural forces called racism. By avoiding a critique of how ordinary
people co-create their toxic experiences and realities, Race Crits have
encouraged them to look only at white “habitus.”178 This traditional
approach indicates that the innocent do not participate in extant racism, and
suggests that they need not examine the way their scanning and interpreting
co-create conceptual limits that already pre-existed within their core
beliefs.
Despite its conceptual limits, Williams and Yamamoto subscribe to the
mindset doctrine. They know that narrative discourse matters. Williams
174. See id. at 62 (providing that habitual patterns of perception allow people to believe
that the way things are is unavoidable and that there will never be a perfect world).
175. See id. at 61 (maintaining that ideology, which is rarely examined, allows people to
believe that the current social climate is reasonable and natural, therefore allowing the elite
to believe that they are not oppressing anyone).
176. See generally Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:
Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 1 ASIAN L.J. 1, 1 (1994)
(emphasizing the need for Asian American legal scholarship to address the unique form of
racism and oppression that Asian Americans face); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and the
Immigration Laws: The Need for Critical Inquiry, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTION, AND NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY 187, 187-98 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (describing how
immigration law and policy in the United States is a source of racial subordination); FRANK
WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002) (evaluating the
alienation that Asian Americans face in America and discussing problems of racial diversity
from an Asian American perspective).
177. See Delgado, supra note 170, at 61-62 (maintaining that most of social reality is
constructed and therefore, people decide what “is, and, almost simultaneously, what ought
to be”).
178. See RICHARD JENKINS, PIERRE BOURDIEU (1992) (defining “habitus” as the manner
and style in which people carry themselves and also as the idea that the thoughtlessness of
habit, rather than learned rules, produces certain “socially competent performances”).

ROBINSON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1390

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/17/2005 11:23:13 AM

[Vol. 53:1361

knows that law students must learn to hear American Indian stories,
precisely because United States history, Washington legislators, and
Bureau of American Indian Affairs agents have devalued their stories. In
order to justify decimating American Indians, destroying their cultural
practices, and confiscating their hunting grounds, white elites produced and
disseminated dominant narrative.179 Through orchestrated efforts, ordinary
people largely consumed this savage image, thus making it easy for most of
them to discount the power of American Indians’ traditional narratives.
Yamamoto knows that we cannot redress interracial conflicts if we do
not assess, reassess, and rearticulate who we are, what we want, and why
we want it. This process requires contending groups to hear each other’s
stories or counterstories.180 By telling stories and counterstories, ordinary
people can begin to take personal responsibility for how they perceive
themselves and others. They can reassess who they would like to be.181
Despite this aspiration, ordinary people (e.g., the liberal subject) lack the
autonomy and agency to assess, reassess, and rearticulate as Yamamoto
requires. Further, they are unable to learn new values through American
Indian storytelling that Williams seeks.
For the unreconstructed
structuralist, ordinary people cannot have human agency, and to the extent
that they engage in assessing, reassessing, and rearticulating, they simply
manipulate language and symbols through the lens of false consciousness
that led them to believe that liberty and freedom are ever possible. It is
also the false consciousness that underwrote the Ho litigation and the
interracial conflict between the blacks and the Nguyen family. Within
structuralist terms, white racism steers ordinary people into a zone where
conflict may arise, especially if they view the world through their false
consciousness. If so, Yamamoto requires the consortium to examine
structural factors. He writes:
Social scientists observe that interminority relations in the United States
have ‘undergone a dramatic shift since the mid-1980s. They have

179. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 562 (1823) (describing American Indians as
a savage, war-making people in holding that American Indians were not able to convey land
to another because they did not own property in the traditional sense of the word); see also
Tee-Hit-Ton v. Washington, 348 U.S. 272, 322-23 (1955) (finding that the United States
government did not owe an American Indian tribe just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment for the taking of land in which the tribe had original American Indian title
because Congress never intended to grant the tribe any permanent rights to the land).
180. See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 880 (remarking that to change the material
conditions of racial oppression, change needs to be representational and those involved need
to examine their own cultural traits, identities, and relationships).
181. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 64 (Univ. of
Chicago 1972) (1962) (“Initially, only the anticipated and usual are experienced . . . .
Further acquaintance, however, does result in awareness of something wrong . . . . That
awareness of anomaly opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the
initial anomalous has become the anticipated.”).
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become more tense, more provoking, and more confusing.’ That shift,
they observe, is tied to shrinking economic pie, continuing Asian and
Latina/o immigration, worsening inner-city living conditions, differential
minority group power, neoconservative political backlash, and expanded
media attention.
Small face-to-face conflicts become full-blown
intergroup controversies—‘more provoking, and more confusing.’ The
intensifying interracial conflicts . . . along with expanding coalitional
efforts, mark the late 1990’s racial landscape.182

Within these antisubordination practices, structural forces dominate,
prevailing over ordinary people.183 By Williams and Yamamoto applying
the mindset doctrine uncritically, they suggest that ordinary people cannot
engage in this assessment and reassessment.184 As the founders had
conceived, they use the mindset doctrine to rebuke elite whites’ use of
white structural oppression. Yet even if they do not think alike, ordinary
people have a “common culture of shared understandings” within their
various communities. In the mid to late 1800s in California, Asians had
human agency. In the early 1900s, elite whites attempted to subvert this
agency through laws like the Alien Land Act. After the California
legislature enacted this clearly racist law, Asians found creative ways to
hold real property. Although living in hostile climates, Asians forged
ahead to the dismay of many whites.185 During slavery, blacks used money
to buy their freedom. They worked within the slavery system, reinforcing
it indirectly, so that they could be “free.” The irony notwithstanding,
blacks had human agency. An antisubordination practice that negates the
subject and her agency cannot help ordinary people. Williams and
Yamamoto keep ordinary people in the blame game, encouraging them to
become self-reflective only so that they can identify the structural forces
that affect their lives. Unintentionally, ordinary people become not
personally responsible but more efficient at proclaiming their innocence
and their victim status, and in so doing, they only marginally inspect their
mindsets (or core beliefs). By proclaiming their innocence, ordinary
people never know that they, too, co-create racism.

182. INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 83.
183. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas—Gendered in Justice/Gendered
Injustice: Latinas, Fronteras and the Law, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 353, 361 (1998)
(contending that structural forces also operate to create inequality between men and women,
allowing men to act as decision-makers in matters that affect women).
184. As of November 4, 2002, when I conducted a Westlaw search using Boolean terms
like “mindset” and “dominant narratives,” I found more than 300 articles, essays, comments,
or notes that cited to the mindset doctrine as it is related to dominant narratives.
185. See generally RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY
OF ASIAN AMERICANS 203-08 (1989) (illustrating how Japanese farmers were able to
overcome oppressive laws by owning and leasing land under the names of their Americanborn children and by operating farms as corporations).
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In relying on the mindset doctrine, Race Crits like Williams and
Yamamoto have little interest in core beliefs, except if they belong to white
elites and a system called white structural oppression. Further, while it is
clear that Race Crits like Richard Delgado have influenced a new
generation of left scholars, none of them has unpacked the disturbing
implications for ordinary people. Even under a so-called radical theory like
CRT, ordinary people can vitiate personal responsibility, proclaim their
innocence, and blame the structural forces that lie solely in white elite
hands. In effect, CRT keeps ordinary people like blacks in a victim’s
conscience. I apply this point with equal vigor in the following section.
D. “Naming Our Own Reality”
The mindset doctrine works closely, if not intimately, with other related
themes like “naming our own reality.” As with mindsets, these themes
violently engage traditional legal scholarship (or legal narratives).186
What then does “naming our own reality” mean if ordinary people like
Asians, American Indians, and blacks do not know that they have adopted
common social practices that operate to support the status quo?
Notwithstanding extant social practices, Homer Adolphus Plessy and Rosa
Parks had human agency. They also helped to shape history. Along with
the railroad company, Plessy willingly created a test case for Louisiana
Courts and for the United States Supreme Court.187 Rosa Parks refused the
bus driver’s order to surrender her seat. Parks stated: “I was quite tired
after spending a full day working. I handle and work on clothing that white
people wear. . . . It just happened that the driver made a demand and I just
didn’t feel like obeying his demand. He called the policeman and I was
arrested and placed in jail. . . .”188 Parks’ arrest sparked the Montgomery
Bus Boycott, all of which brought the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., to
national prominence.189 As such, ordinary people like blacks can name
their own reality by saying simply: “I refuse.” Does this simple, powerful
phrase supplant white structural oppression? If so, does it suggest that an
ordinary person’s self can never be truly negated? If not, how do Race
Crits explain Parks’ refusal? From whence did it emanate?

186. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 827 (1993) (concluding that CRT storytelling has
benefits for those at the bottom and that it is a legal scholarship which should be explored
further). But see Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth, and Narrative in the Social
Construction of the Black Self, 40 HOW. L.J. 1, 102-25 (1996) (criticizing the legal analysis
of Farber and Sherry).
187. IRONS, supra note 163, at 222.
188. See id. at 222-23 (describing how Parks’ arrest led to the eventual desegregation of
buses in Montgomery, Alabama).
189. Id. at 223.
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“I refuse” complicates the idea that structural forces can completely
negate a subject, a way of naming their own reality. Thus, “I refuse”
becomes Sartre’s ever-present consciousness. Giving negation a positive
place, Pierre Schlag writes that “negation for Sartre is like a worm, a
corroding, corrupting, destructive, continuous presence.”190 Yet, naming
our own reality appears to conflict with the mindset doctrine, in which
dominant narratives support exploitative social arrangements, making them
normal, natural, and inevitable.191 Nevertheless, Race Crits believe that
despite these powerful narratives, ordinary people can subvert white racism
and liberal consciousness.192 This naming allows ordinary people to
reclaim an agency little different from Rosa Parks when she said, “I
refuse.” For Sartre, this destructive naming would be a consciousness that
structural forces could never negate. For Race Crits, what is this source?
Delgado vacillates between blacks, the poor, and women as victims and
as powerful reality creators. He argues that “we decide what [reality] is,
and, almost simultaneously, what ought to be.”193 And then, within the
same breath, Delgado marks blacks as victims of white structural
oppression. “Narrative habits, patterns of seeing, shape what we see and
that to which we aspire. These patterns of perception become habitual,
tempting us to believe that the way things are is inevitable, or the best that
can be in an imperfect world. Alternative visions of reality are not
explored, or, if they are, rejected as extreme or implausible.”194 And so,
society declares war on the black mind. “They contend for, tug at, our
minds.”195 Does society tug at our minds because it recognizes, as I have
already argued, that inner narratives have “reality-creating potential”?196
By vilifying the Nguyen family, by engaging in economic terror, and by
disrupting the mediation process, blacks were reality creators, and they
allowed the Neighborhood Committee for Justice to push a family out of its
hard-earned business. And in so doing, blacks asserted an agency, using
racial identity as a sword and race consciousness as a bludgeon. Rather
than find common ground with a Vietnamese community relatively new to
190. Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1195, 1219 (1989).
191. See Delgado, supra note 120, at 60 (noting that the dominant group’s narratives
affirm its superior status, putting the blame for inequality not on itself but on cultural lag or
lack of adequate enforcement of laws that would help the minority groups).
192. See id. at 61 (illustrating that through storytelling or counterstories, ordinary people
can overcome the dominant group’s narratives because storytelling provides community
building functions, allowing ordinary people to find a way out of the realm of exclusion and
to reallocate power).
193. Id. at 61-62.
194. Id. at 62.
195. Id.
196. See id. (expressing that stories have the potential to show reality when they do not
entail a full assault on one group).
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New Orleans, blacks acquired justice at the expense of a family, little
different from them, that was seeking a place in a community. Where is
the borderland that justifies blacks foisting their already possessed power
onto those with less power? Of course, we can complicate this equation by
talking comfortably about oppressive intersectionality. Yet, in truth, blacks
like other people must choose to be victims, just as they chose to victimize
the Nguyen family. Blacks must choose to act irresponsibly, to act without
appreciating cause, effect, and consequences.197 By filing a lawsuit, the
Nguyens sought a voice, one that would bring all interested parties to the
table, a dialogue in which blacks could perhaps see the Nguyen family as
just like them. Unfortunately, Race Crits like Delgado, Williams, and
Yamamoto refuse to see all people as empowered agents who have learned
first at home to grow weary of successive failure—the only road to dream
catching. Given the history of the civil rights movement and the sorry case
of the Nguyen conflict, blacks have been powerful reality creators who, for
countless reasons, many of them historically situated, have learned to group
think by internalizing a racial identity and by imposing a race
consciousness on their experiences.198 And through this internalization,
blacks have purposefully consumed a structured way of seeing themselves,
a disempowering way of co-creating their personal experiences.
Can I conclude that Race Crits have abandoned subject positionality,
counterstories, and “naming our own reality” as CRT’s central features?199
If so, can I conclude that only white agents like justices, corporate leaders,
and purveyors of cultural hegemony can manufacture and manipulate social
reality? That is, whites possess the power of cause and effect.200 For
blacks, women, and the poor, social reality remains an out-there, objective,
and external experience over which they have no personal power.201 What
197. See DAVID R. HAWKINS, POWER VS. FORCE: THE HIDDEN DETERMINANTS OF HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 55-56 (1995). According to Hawkins,
As perception itself evolves with one’s level of consciousness, it becomes apparent
that what the world calls the domain of causes is in fact the domain of effects. By
taking responsibility for the consequences of his own perceptions, the observer can
transcend the role of victim to an understanding that ‘nothing out there has power
over you.’
Id.
198. See generally ROBERT H. BRISBANE, BLACK ACTIVISM: RACIAL REVOLUTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1954-1970 (1974) (discussing the rise of black activism following the
Brown decision by analyzing groups such as the NAACP, the Urban League, the SNCC, and
the Black Panthers).
199. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 61, at 1287 (explaining that minority
narratives are given very little credibility because minorities are associated with such
stereotypes as lazy, watermelon eaters, below average, and intellectually inadequate).
200. See ROBERT H. HOPCKE, THERE ARE NO ACCIDENTS: SYNCHRONICITY AND THE
STORIES OF OUR LIVES 27 (1997) (suggesting that cause and effect thinking results in an
illusion of power and control over reality).
201. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race Consciousness:
Can Thick, Legal
Contextual Analysis Assist Poor, Low-Status Workers Overcome Discriminatory Hurdles in
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then becomes of “naming our own reality”? Given my model, this
“naming” power must be a vital element of macro individual agency and
social practices. By embracing structural determinism and by asserting that
blacks cannot subvert white structural oppression, Race Crits have
effectively reinscribed blacks as victims. That is, white structural
oppression victimizes blacks, browns, yellows, and reds, and in response,
they can do nothing—no words, no telling, no pointing, no hollering!
Nothing! Delgado and Stefancic write:
Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior
carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a long-gone
era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, like animals sneering and
posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of the colony. It is
performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals’ behavior is.
Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive to those engaged in it,
while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages. The notion that more
speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter
this system of oppression is appealing, lofty, romantic—and wrong.202

Why then should law students listen to wisdom-based stories when they
prepare to assist American Indians? Why should legal scholars ever care if
they translate their critical socio-legal analysis into useful tools against
subordination practices? Why should progressive race theorists, political
lawyers, and community activists reassess and rebuild their
antisubordination tools in preparation for the next context out of which
interracial group conflict might arise? Why spend any time reassessing
cultural traits and rearticulating racial identities if voices, however shrill,
mean nothing?
Yet, thoughts do matter. In fact, thoughts cause matter.203 If hegemonic
stories have so fixed the mind of whites, then they have equally poisoned
black minds.204 If so, then whites and blacks have become powerful reality
creators in the social dynamics that we call racism.
As such, Williams and Yamamoto must critique not only the structural
features of racism, but also mind constructs that whites, blacks, browns,
yellows, and reds use to co-create racism. In this sense, blacks and whites
have been “naming [their] own reality” since they first encountered each
the Fast Food Industry? A Reply to Regina Austin, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 274-75
(2000) (discussing how the use of fast-food worker ethnographies only reinforces cause and
effect thinking and does not adequately challenge the central assumptions of CRT).
202. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 61, at 1288.
203. See FRITJOF CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS: AN EXPLORATION OF THE PARALLELS
BETWEEN MODERN PHYSICS AND EASTERN MYSTICISM 141 (3d ed., expanded 1991)
(speculating that atomic physicists do not merely observe the world, but rather participate in
creating the world “to the extent that [they] influence the properties of the observed
objects”).
204. See Lawrence, supra note 13, at 326 (asserting that all people “unconsciously
harbor” racist attitudes because of racism’s unavoidable influence upon society).
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other and they have done so differently across various contexts and shifting
time-space. If true, whites cannot victimize blacks. Certainly, whites have
committed atrocities against blacks. But to be victimized, blacks must give
their power away; they must volunteer, or acquiesce, in serving it up.
Blacks can allow whites to steal their minds and, in so doing, adopt a racial
identity, seeing the world through a race consciousness and blaming white
structural racism for oppressing them. In this sense, words, stories, and
naming do matter because they cause matter. Yet, by positing that the first
cause of racial oppression must be white structural racism, Race Crits like
Delgado, Stefancic, Williams, and Yamamoto dare not look at how blacks
use race, racial identity, and race consciousness to co-create and participate
in structural issues. By bracketing race, racial identity, and race
consciousness (e.g., consciousness), critical race practice cannot liberate
blacks because Race Crits like Williams and Yamamoto ignore the role that
blacks play in co-creating white structural oppression.
III. BEYOND THE NEGATED SUBJECTIVITY OF CRITICAL RACE
PRACTICE/PRAXIS: A PRIOR CONSCIOUSNESS CONCEPTION OF HUMAN
AGENCY
A. Overview
I have attempted to demonstrate in my prior works205 that Race Crits
cannot use CRT to end racism and promote liberation.
As a
methodological framework, CRT fails as antisubordination practice
because Race Crits presume that white racism and white structural
oppression happen to ordinary people. To this extent, white racism
victimizes ordinary people and white structural oppression robs them of
basic liberties and freedoms. Accordingly, for this practice to succeed,
Race Crits must not only show ordinary people how the system works
against them but also must convince elites to do better by ordinary people.
In the end, white racism and white structural oppression must be external,
objective social realities over which ordinary people have no real control.
By embracing a structuralist approach to antisubordination practice,
Race Crits posit that the social reality of white racism happens to ordinary
people, negating their subjectivity, and constructing them so that they
205. See generally Reginald Leamon Robinson, “Expert” Knowledge: Introductory
Comments on Race Consciousness, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 145, 145 (2000) (arguing
that racial oppression may come equally from blacks in their “expert” knowledge, as from
whites and white racial oppression); Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race Consciousness: A
Mere Means of Preventing Escapes from the Control of Her White Master? An Allegoric
Essay, 15 TOURO L. REV. 401, 406, 436-37 (1999) (debating the utility of race
consciousness as an antisubordination practice); Robinson, supra note 26, at 231
(denouncing race consciousness as the continued center of racism and white supremacy).

ROBINSON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

1/17/2005 11:23:13 AM

ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL RACE PRACTICE/PRAXIS

1397

cannot be heard and so that they engage in interracial conflicts. Under this
approach, American Indians cannot benefit from the power of their
narratives until whites hear and abide by them. Asians and blacks engage
in interracial conflict because they have consumed stereotypical narratives
about each other and believing these narratives they are pushed into
conflict by society. Do these ordinary people have subjectivity? For Race
Crits, ordinary people have no subjectivity. Thus, they have no agency.
Structural racism oppresses and victimizes them, but they are innocent. As
such, ordinary people can act irresponsibly until whites appreciate them
and confess wrongdoing or until the consortium empowers them so that
they gradually weaken and permanently end structural forces. Read
differently, Race Crits believe that ordinary people are liberal subjects who
cannot truly be autonomous agents of their co-creative powers to embrace
ideas that rob them of liberation, including racial identity and race
consciousness. Why then would American Indian narratives matter if they
cannot act on the implicit power within their own stories? Why bother
assessing, reassessing, and rearticulating if Race Crits leave ordinary
people as raced subjects, a false liberal construct? Race Crits do not
address these issues, preferring to place the locus of white structural
oppression outside of ordinary people.
Unfortunately, Race Crits cannot imagine that ordinary people use their
beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and imagination to co-create personal
experiences and social realities. Co-creation rests on four indispensable
elements: beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and imaginations.206 If we add
intensity to the emotional element,207 then social events happen relatively
quickly and permanently.208 And so core beliefs, deep thoughts, strong
emotions, and powerful imaginations project love, joy, and fear into an
“external” world.209 Consider race and racism. Historically, ordinary
people have individually or collectively shared strong feelings about this
topic. We co-created slavery, and we ended it. Today, we have equally
strong feelings. Here are some examples: First, race is socially real and
politically meaningful. Second, white racism is a permanent feature of
206. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Poverty, the Underclass, and the Role of Race
Consciousness: A New Age Critique of Black Wealth/White Wealth and American
Apartheid, 34 IND. L. REV. 1377, 1380-81 (2001) (book review) (explaining how thinking,
talking, and acting inform a person’s consciousness and how this consciousness, in turn,
confirms a person’s conception of the nature of social reality).
207. See ROBERTS, supra note 45, at 74 (asserting that beliefs motivate a person’s
“emotions and imagination” and that when a certain belief is no longer held, “emotions and
imagination” attach themselves to other beliefs).
208. See ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 34 (proffering that people may feel connections
with others arising out of shared social events that have affected their consciousness at some
level).
209. See id. at 58 (stating that a person’s central beliefs influence his or her conception
of reality because similar beliefs are concentrated around them).
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American life. Third, blacks are plagued by daily discrimination. Fourth,
as an external, objective reality, white structural oppression is a victimizer
of ordinary people. Society mirrors these core beliefs. Thus, external,
objective reality cannot exist without ordinary people. In effect, social
reality is ordinary people.210
B. Negated Subjectivity: The Central Problem of Practice and Praxis
Practice and Praxis negate the self as subject. By pushing the subject
under, Williams and Yamamoto cannot use these antisubordination
practices to engage in “fundamental criticism.”211 By negating the self as
subject, they assume that structural forces are the determining text over
which ordinary people have no authority. Accordingly, ordinary people do
not read this text, for reading requires decoding, which in turn confesses
encoding. Encoding translates text, making it conform to pre-existing
understandings.212 In this sense, encoding is co-creation. The determining
text tells ordinary people who they are, what events mean, where they can
live, how they can engage the enemy, and what they can imagine. When
structural forces act like determining text, they become the “seat of
meaning.”213 This text eclipses an ordinary person’s self, “leaving [her] at
best an empty vehicle for the reiteration of the meanings generated by
interpretative communities.”214 By effectively annihilating the self as
subject, Williams and Yamamoto relieve ordinary people of personal
responsibility and co-creative power.
Yet, Williams and Yamamoto suggest that this determining text leaves
space in which ordinary people can engage in meaningful antisubordination
practice. If left scholars teach students how to listen, they can find fair,
moral solutions to oppression buried within American Indian narratives.
By listening to these solutions, law students validate American Indians who
210. See id. at 78 (arguing that people have the power to change reality by focusing on
positive beliefs to the exclusion of negative beliefs; for example, by focusing on “health,
vigor, and abundance” instead of “poverty, illness, or lack”).
211. See John C. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129,
2136 (1992) (defining “fundamental criticism” as criticism that “overview[s] the
communities-of-assumptions and challenges them when they become detached from
reality”).
212. See Schlag, supra note 26, at 37. Literary critic Morris Zapp stated,
To understand a message is to decode it. Language is a code. But every decoding
is another encoding. If you say something to me I check that I have understood
your message by saying it back to you in my own words, that is, different words
from the ones you used, for if I repeat your own words exactly you will doubt
whether I have really understood you. But if I use my words it follows that I have
changed your meaning, however slightly . . . .
Id.
213. Id. at 42.
214. Id. at 43.
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have been marginalized by structural forces and who cannot use these
stories as powerful, positive co-creative forces in their own communities.
By applying these solutions, law students can reach fair results, illustrating
that disenfranchised people have been wrongly deprived of their rightful
place in society. Likewise, if the consortium can assess, reassess, and
rearticulate ways of experiencing structural forces, then racial groups can
purge themselves of false consciousness, end interracial conflicts, and form
coalitions out of which each group promotes racial justice. To the extent
that the negated self has been treated as a dumping group for oppressive
seats of meaning, then Practice and Praxis wipe out false consciousness.
Without the totalizing influences of structural forces, ordinary people who
have had their true consciousness negated can reclaim their selves as
subjects and can eradicate subordinating practices like interracial conflicts.
If Practice and Praxis throw life jackets to negated subjects, then
Williams and Yamamoto imagine that ordinary people know that
something is wrong. That is, ordinary people know that some irreducible
“thing” exists within them, and they seek to reclaim it. Do they know that
structural forces cannot truly determine how they must live (e.g.,
practice)?215 Do they sense that the determining text never escapes
interpretation because ordinary people read this text in a way that
reinforces their extant customs? If so, Williams and Yamamoto do not let
on. They also never tell us what false consciousness, or the determining
text, has displaced. Is true consciousness the displaced, irreducible “thing”
that monitors how ordinary people negotiate these structural forces through
their daily practices?216 What is true consciousness? Is it a language
game? Does it have content? In any event, this irreducible “thing” must be
a prior consciousness that prods the contingent, liberal self to practice as it
pleases.217 By suggesting that ordinary peoples’ negated selves can
appreciate a reassessment and rearticulation, Williams and Yamamoto
confess that ordinary people not only co-create what they experience to
some real, discernible degree, but also that they purposefully engage in
subordinating practices like interracial conflict.
Is it possible to privilege the self so that it can reclaim its prior nonliberal consciousness and so that it can function within a liberal society? Is
the negated subject a false construct? The self becomes embattled at
215. Id. at 44 (contending that structural forces cannot account for the broad range of
human behavior because they are limited by their own “universal,” “systematic,” and
“univocal” nature).
216. See R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 6 (1967) (suggesting that all people
have a “personal idiom,” or personal way of experiencing their body, others, and reality).
217. See TERRY PINKARD, DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL UNION 6 (1987)
(discussing how Kant’s true self engages in autonomous action by following the essential
self and not the contingent self).
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home.218 Behind the doctrine of family privacy, the liberal state permits
parents to transmit values to their children.219 Parents thus make their
children liberal subjects when they give them a race and when they pass
along racialized lenses.
Long before white racism becomes the
determining text, parents nudge their children’s true, non-race
consciousness aside220 so that they adopt the interpretive practices (e.g.,
actions) of authority figures.221
Can derogatory text displace an ordinary person’s interpretive practice?
In Antwone Fisher,222 Antwone’s foster parent called him nigger so much
that he thought his name was nigger. He knew which nigger was meant for
him and which was meant for his two foster brothers. Antwone Fisher told
us that it was Antwone’s foster parent’s abuse, not white racism, that
injured him.223 Yet, Antwone hated whites and his deep, angry distrust
surfaced whenever his peers ridiculed him. Antwone did not rely on
empowering stories. Having a false self, he did not work well with others.
Did structural forces abuse Antwone? Was his foster parent an agent of
white structural oppression?224 As a child, Antwone often ran away to his
friend’s house when he suffered abuse. Did he feel that these practices
were wrong?
Would Williams and Yamamoto fault “borderland”
oppression? Is this form of oppression an interpretive practice? Is it a
determining text on which structural forces rely to divide and conquer?

218. See JERRY HICKS & ESTHER HICKS, ABRAHAM SPEAKS: A NEW BEGINNING I—
HANDBOOK FOR JOYOUS SURVIVAL 42 (1996).
[At home], you are surrounded by beings who have already arrived at many
conclusions. They have created within themselves many beliefs based upon the life
experience that they have lived—or upon the stories that they have heard from
those who surrounded them at the time that they were born.
Id.
219. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 669 F.2d
67 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding “that the governmental power should supercede parental authority
in all cases because some parents may act in other than the best interest of their children
[and that] is ‘repugnant to the American tradition’”).
220. See Clarence Page, Biracial Kids Face Burden of Two Worlds, HOUS. CHRON., Mar.
14, 1996, at 1D (denouncing blacks who instruct multiracial children to “identify strictly as
black” because this “internalization of white supremacist attitudes” transmits and enforces
these same attitudes in multiracial children more effectively than efforts by white
supremacists).
221. See ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 67 (saying that individuals possess their own
identity but that parents make efforts to ensure that their young children “relate in physical
terms” to the world).
222. Fox Searchlight Pictures (2002).
223. See ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 67 (noting that “[t]hese [core beliefs] will reinforce
the family group when the child most needs protection” and that “this sharing of mutual
ideas not only protects the new offspring from dangers obvious to the parents; it also serves
as a framework within which the child can grow”).
224. See Williams, Checks and Balances, supra note 19, at 1022 (noting that a person’s
understanding of a specific situation can be impaired by his or her perceptions of larger,
social discourses without realizing such an understanding may be based on prejudice or
stereotypes).
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Nevertheless, Antwone used his therapy to reclaim his lost self. He sought
out his birth mother, only to engage in an unrequited speech. He found his
foster parent, only to reject her warm welcome with a fiery speech about
overcoming. Who spoke to his mother and his foster parent? Was it the
monitoring, irreducible “thing” that knew he was not a nigger? Or was it
still his contingent, liberal self who proclaimed the right to live as a proud,
un-niggered black man?225 In these antisubordination practices, Williams
and Yamamoto never tell us who surfaces—whether it is true
consciousness or a relatively unburdened liberal self.
Despite their antisubordination practices, ordinary people who are raced
may be relatively unburdened liberal selves, but they still have negated
subjectivities.226 With guidance from the consortium, they can deconstruct
structural forces, believing that they can now interpret the world as
relatively autonomous subjects. Having jettisoned annihilating mindsets,
they can name their own reality by reclaiming their racial heritage. They
can now live as free black or Asian people. By reassessing and
rearticulating (e.g., naming), ordinary people can heal and end interracial
conflicts.227 They can throw false consciousness away or lighten its
burdensome weight, so that they can reclaim an identity, however
interpreted, that ironically grew out of slavery. Do they realize that they
co-created this false consciousness? Do they remember that they always
had the power to alter their lives? Within liberalism, ordinary people can
only be relatively autonomous selves, intuitively knowing that they can
never escape a regulative practice. With relative autonomy, ordinary
people now have choices. They can choose a positive black image or a
self-annihilating one. Is this choice evidence of co-creation? Without
accessing ordinary peoples’ co-creative powers, antisubordination practices
cannot liberate them.228 Ordinary people are negated subjects.229
225. See Calmore, supra note 211, at 2145 (entertaining that such a contingent liberal
self would have to “constantly question and challenge” every aspect of life, searching out
“[w]hite speech, white schooling, white law, white work, white religion, white love, even
white lies . . .”).
226. See Williams, Checks and Balances, supra note 19, at 1021.
The power in this system of privileges, its hidden and overt traces . . . distorts our
very ways of seeing and knowing the world . . . . Our inability to understand how
this complex system of oppression might operate in contexts less familiar than our
own is radically subverted by our inability to escape totally its meaning in and for
our lives.
Id.; see also INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 109-14 (discussing positionality as an
aspect of simultaneity).
227. See Schlag, supra note 26, at 47 (emphasizing that “the self realizes that it is always
already operating within a context of interpretive practice that it has not chosen and cannot
fully articulate”).
228. See ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 31 (contending that liberation is achieved when
people realize that they form their own reality, take responsibility for their own being, and
change areas of their life that are displeasing to them).
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Unfortunately, CRT resonates with liberal constructs. In the West,
classical liberalism grants ordinary people a safe haven, so that they can
experience a constrained agency, one purporting to promote social goods
and avoid social wrongs. As myth goes, ordinary people established by
contract an external, objective thing called “the state.” They partitioned the
liberal world into private and public spheres, so that through utilitarian
rules, they could pursue selfish, private utilities, such as life, liberty, and
property. The currency by which they would transact these utilities is
rights. In a Rawlsian world, justice that requires equality of opportunity
mediates rights.230 In the modern world, ordinary people have more or less
the same rights, unless race and white racism devalue their currency, giving
them smaller margins or diminishing returns.231 In this world, demanding
the right to live as unfettered black citizens, ordinary people turn to the
state. After all, they are not powerful reality creators. Social things are
happening to them and so they experience themselves as having an agency
undermined by larger, sociological events. For CRT, these experiences
flow out of a state captured by white racists and informed by white
structural oppression.
Accordingly, Race Crits like Williams and
Yamamoto have proffered antisubordination practices that gradually return
ordinary people to empowered citizens who can transact in rights currency
in a larger, structural world that makes no qualitative distinction between
citizens’ rights. Unfortunately, it is a world in which agency confronts
structure. A world in which structure victimizes ordinary people, who by
necessity become bearers of inferior currency—“minority rights.”
Within these antisubordination practices, Williams and Yamamoto keep
ordinary people in a liberal construct. Even if they use these practices to
end white structural oppression, ordinary people seek racial justice. That
is, ordinary people have a race, and it is real. Refusing to accept that race
is without content, a never-been-there trope, ordinary people can only see
themselves as raced liberal subjects, and as such they must eradicate the
structural forces that negate this existence. Ordinary people have thus
linked their negated self-image with an external, objective reality. Within
229. See id. at 13 (repeating that people create their own reality through their beliefs
about themselves and the nature of reality or, that people “create [their] experiences through
[their] expectations”).
230. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65-70, 130-39 (rev. ed. 1999) (theorizing
that under the difference principle, the wealthy cannot have high expectations unless they
work to improve the situations of the poor members of society).
231. See Calmore, supra note 211, at 2142. Calmore states that:
[T]he so-called American dilemma—the increasing gap between the nation’s
egalitarian ideals and its actual practices—is conveniently resolved by ‘white
America’ by rejecting the terms of racist domination and oppression and referring
instead to African American inability or disinclination to take advantage of the true
equality of opportunities the nation offers.
Id.
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CRT and these antisubordination practices, they experience themselves as
simply vessels filled with white racism’s determining text. Racial justice
surgically removes this text from the minds of ordinary people. Without it,
the deeply resonating, irreducible “thing” that has always been there cannot
surface. With it, this “thing” can sing hosannas. It has been delivered. It
need not prowl beneath racism’s determining text. But what is this
“thing”? In CRT terms, it is a raced consciousness. Without racial justice,
ordinary people simply cannot “be” themselves. With it, they can walk the
streets, experiencing real, raced citizenship, perhaps for the first time.
They know that if whites utter the nigger invective, they will have
substantive, legal recourse. Practice and Praxis liberate ordinary people so
that they can live well as liberal, raced, and thus negated subjects.
As such, Williams and Yamamoto have not imagined these
antisubordination practices placing ordinary people outside of a liberal
framework. Within this framework, ordinary people become nothing more
than rights-bearing subjects who pursue the ideal of classical liberalism.
As rights-bearers, they must constantly monitor the state so that they can
protect that which nature endowed to them: self-determination. To this
extent, ordinary people perennially negotiate with the state (e.g., courts) so
that stakeholders can mediate competing rights through an accommodation
scheme that advances one set of rights without doing undue injury to
another.232 In this way, human agents must patrol the visible borders
between rights and structural forces. If rights mean agency, these practices
have not taken ordinary people beyond a “structure” versus “agency”
dialectic. Seeking to empower American Indian cosmologies and to
eradicate interracial conflicts, these practices proffer modest, liberal
solutions that invite ordinary people to imagine themselves not as earthly
gods on which social reality depends for its very existence, but as entitled
rights-bearers upon whom structural forces have laid the determining text,
thus denying them the power of their stories and keeping them arrayed
against each other in interracial conflicts. In effect, these antisubordination
practices reinforce the idea that structural forces victimize ordinary people.
C. Radical Departures: The Limits of Giddens’ Duality of
Structure and Agency
Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory radically departs from this
traditional sociological approach to understanding and modeling social
experiences.233 Giddens focuses on human agency. By agency, he means
232. See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112
(1956) (maintaining that an employer’s rights over property must be balanced against the
employees’ rights to self-organization).
233. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY
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“the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal
beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world.”234 Agency is
intentional, purposeful action,235 which is the “continuous flow of ‘livedthrough experience.’” Agency’s “categorization into discrete sectors or
‘pieces’ depends upon a reflexive process of attention of the actor, or the
regard of another.”236 Structure is not “social structure.” Traditionally,
social structure meant something that was outside and external to human
action. Rather, existing only in and through human action, structure
reveals “form and shape to social life.”237 Human action thus becomes the
giver of social life. To understand its form and shape, we should analyze
human imaginations. As a feature of social life, structure has no
describable qualities. Structure has only a virtual existence. For example,
language has structure and form, but it is invisible. To the extent that
language exists, it lives as a part of human activities.238 In this way,
structure flows from human memory. It takes form and shape when
humans construct rules to govern their activities. Rules are not regulative
norms that carry punishment. Rules are habitual practices that reproduce
social practices.239 Rules are not structural properties, and we cannot study
structure by examining human rules.
Under a theory of structuration, human action gives social systems a notthere existence in time-space. This virtual existence emanates from human
thought. Structure reveals not only aggregating action but also experiences
on which ordinary people place value. Although he rejects radical
subjectivism, Giddens blends minds, agency, and experience. It is the
duality of structure and agency.240 Within this theory, structure means
rules and resources that exist over time-space by which society, through
human action, reproduces itself. Within this theory, structure possesses
two kinds of rules: normative elements and codes of signification.
OF STRUCTURATION xx-xxi (1984) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY] (explaining a
structuration theory that merges two opposing camps of modern sociological theory, the
“subject” and the “social object,” into one theory, thus giving rise to his “duality of
structure”).
234. ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE,
AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 55 (1979).
235. See Martin O’Brien, The Sociology of Anthony Giddens: An Introduction, in
CONVERSATIONS WITH ANTHONY GIDDENS: MAKING SENSE OF MODERNITY 1, 9 (Anthony
Giddens & Christopher Pierson eds., 1998) (reiterating that “sociology should attend to the
world as a world that holds meaning and personal significance for its members, whose
intentions, in one way or another, are central to sociological understanding”).
236. ANTHONY GIDDENS, NEW RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 81 (1993).
237. Anthony Giddens, A Reply to My Critics, in SOCIAL THEORY OF MODERN SOCIETIES:
ANTHONY GIDDENS AND HIS CRITICS 249, 256 (David Held & John B. Thompson eds., 1989)
[hereinafter THEORY OF MODERN SOCIETIES].
238. See CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 233, at 76 (establishing that language
exists “in so far as it actually forms part of what people do in their day-to-day use of it”).
239. Id. at 19-21.
240. Id. at xxi.
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Resources come in two kinds of packages: authoritative and allocative.
Authoritative resources coordinate human action, while allocative
resources control material products or the material world.241 In this way,
unlike traditional sociology that places agency simply with human beings,
structuration theory argues that agency flows out of ordinary people’s
actions and connects directly to their self-consciousness.
Under structuration theory, structural properties and social systems have
real properties. However, they have no physical existence. They are not
things like cars. Existing in time-space, structural properties, like
institutional practices, and social systems, like American slavery, depend
on human routines (e.g., actions and habits). Nevertheless, they can be
fixed and hard. For example, ordinary people still struggle with racial
attitudes, many of which originate in a time-space outside of their
immediate experiences. In the Durkheimian sense, “society is a structured
phenomenon.”242 A group’s or a society’s structural properties “have effect
upon the way people act, feel and think.”243 Not existing as external,
tangible objects, it is clear that ordinary people must reproduce these
structures, not only in how they use language but also in their attitudes.
For example, language does not exist anywhere. Yet, it has rules and
regulative practices. If an ordinary person violates these rules and
practices, society reacts. By using language, ordinary people bring it to
life. Therefore, “society only has form and that form only has effects on
people in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people
do.”244
Under structuration theory, practical consciousness thus becomes very
important.245 At any given time, society’s structure confesses its norms,
rules, and regulations. Groups and communities have perhaps similar
structures, perhaps micro-structures. At a broader social level, practical
consciousness is what ordinary people “know about what they do, and why
they do it—their knowledgeability as agents.”246 Like tacit knowledge,
ordinary people simply know things, and they rely on these almost
intuitively known social structures even if they cannot directly explain how
and what they know.247 They can tell you why. They may refuse to talk.
They might not know the answer.248 In this way, practical consciousness
241. Id. at xxxi.
242. O’Brien, supra note 235, at 77.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 233, at xxiii (“The significance of practical
consciousness is a leading theme of the book.”).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 3 (“To be a human being is to be a purposive agent, who both has reasons for
his or her activities and is able, if asked, to elaborate discursively upon those reasons
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works interdependently with discursive consciousness and unconscious
motives.249 Regardless, through routinization, ordinary people produce and
reproduce social life, including the rules and resources on which structural
and institutional features of social systems depend.250
They also
reflectively monitor themselves and others. After all, purposive action can
produce unintended consequences.
Through this monitoring, they
understand themselves, and they justify (e.g., rationalize) the routine in
which they may knowingly engage.251
To a degree, Giddens’ duality of structure and agency directly folds
ordinary people into the reproduction of social life, including white racism
and white structural oppression. Ordinary people are purposive agents, and
through the rules, routines, and resources of structure, they reproduce social
life. This life can be deeply embedded, thus becoming structural properties
(e.g., constitutions). To the extent that ordinary people reproduce aspects
of social life that build on these properties, they produce practices that
appear to move across time-space, thus becoming institutions (e.g.,
slavery).252 By implication, ordinary people who were slaves and masters
played indispensable roles in producing, reproducing, and transforming the
institution of slavery.
As such, “all rules are inherently
253
transformational.”
By depending on rules and by engaging in purposive
act, structure cannot constrain what ordinary people do.254 Instead,
structure, which reflects a wide range of purposive actions, enables and
constrains human agency. It follows that under a structuration theory,
ordinary people directly participate in the reproduction of white structural
oppression, even if they do not intend to do so.
For example, based on the practical consciousness principle, ordinary
people like blacks know the social rules by which they participate in
reproducing social life. All human agents have this knowledge. Based on
this knowledge, ordinary people have a sense of what they can do, get,
achieve, and experience. On the subject of employment, they may say that
corporations simply refuse to hire blacks.255 Is this statement a rule? Are
they describing a social practice? Are they formulating a rule that explains
their unemployment? In either case, by describing or formulating, they

(including lying about them).”).
249. Id. at 7.
250. Id. at xxxi.
251. Id. at 3-4.
252. Id. at 17.
253. Id.
254. THEORY OF MODERN SOCIETIES, supra note 237, at 269.
255. See, e.g., Janny Scott, Nearly Half of Black Men Found Jobless, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2004, at B1 (discussing a study that found the number of black men employed in New
York City to be 51.8%, a lower proportion than other ethnic and gender groups).
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have interpreted the rules.256 As Zapp would say, they have encoded the
rule, thus co-creating it.257 How many times must ordinary people repeat
this rule before they begin to reproduce the experience as part of their
social life?
By applying the structuration theory, Giddens’ radical departure from
traditional sociology rejects the theory that social structures exist
autonomously and independently from ordinary people who are human
agents.258 Although this rough summary cannot do justice to Giddens’ very
complex and nuanced theory, it boils down to this proposition: with
practical consciousness, human agents engage in purposive practices that
produce and reproduce structures and social systems, and if structures and
systems exist across time and space, they become structural properties and
institutions, thus telling us about human agents. Over time, structures
change, and this change can be directly attributed to human agents who use
rules transformationally. By implication, structures constrain and enable
agents, and to this degree, even if resource dependent, human agents can
alter practices and social systems. In this way, human agents cannot be
victims, for this concept contradicts the inherent power of agency. To fault
society, human agents must implicate themselves. They reproduce social
life too. They must account for the ways in which they intentionally and
unintentionally reinforce practices about which they complain. Under
structuration theory, human agents are absolutely indispensable ingredients
in reinforcing and transforming social life.
Therefore, under structuration theory, Yamamoto cannot relieve ordinary
people of reflective, personal responsibility. With practical and reflective
consciousness, ordinary people adopt practices that produce immediate
effects in their lives and in the aggregate reproduce social life. These
practices impact them and others. In this way, even if they cannot
understand the Gulf War II’s grand design, ordinary people can support it
in their words, deeds, feelings, and imagination. They can protest the war
too. As such, ordinary people cannot be victims, and they actively
participate in their own victimhood.259 Under reflective consciousness,
ordinary people can be socially influenced and socialized.260 Regardless,
256. See CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 233, at 23 (citing laws as an example of
rules that are formulated and subsequently codified).
257. See Schlag, supra note 26, at 37-38 (referring to literary critic and professor Morris
Zapp’s theory that language must be decoded to be understood and then encoded again to
communicate it to another).
258. CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 233, at xxxi-ii.
259. See MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE, supra note 40, at 35-36 (asserting that blacks
in the United States refuse to discuss their successes in the presence of whites, preferring to
continue a cult of victimology whereby blacks are to keep whites “on the hook”).
260. See Janet E. Helms, The Beginnings of a Diagnostic Model of Racial Identity, in
BLACK AND WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 83, 94-96 (Janet
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they have ultimate responsibility for what they do, say, feel, and imagine.
Although Yamamoto’s practice has many subtleties, he impermissibly
relieves ordinary people of personal responsibility by adopting a relatively
abandoned idea of structuralism that overrides judgments, morality, and
self-awareness, leading to a distasteful Nuremburg defense. By describing
ordinary people as knowledgeable agents, Williams and Yamamoto can
develop a model that teaches right action, right mind, and right practice.261
Right now, they have proffered an antisubordination practice that
victimizes ordinary people by describing them as human vessels who have
had their true consciousness displaced by a determining text.262 Along with
a broader rebuke to social structures, this approach indicts the parents of
ordinary people.263 Giddens advances a better model because structuration
posits that human agents have always been strategically monitoring and
engaging in practices that maximize their biological survival.264 Unlike
Williams and Yamamoto, Giddens suggests that a proper critical theory can
prompt a better outcome if it attempts to re-educate human agents who
monitor and learn anyway. If they monitor, learn, and forbear, then
ordinary people can make choices, and if they make choices, they can take
personal responsibility.
Consider how structuration might operate in popular culture. Consider
Rabbit Proof Fence as a cine-narrative about critically thinking Aborigines
who used their minds and agency to control their destiny.265 In Rabbit
Proof Fence, Mr. Neville, a white charged with the resettlement of halfcaste Aborigines, reminds a constable that blacks do think too, saying “just
because they use Neolithic tools, it doesn’t mean that they are Neolithic
thinkers.” Pushed by his failure to find three half-caste Aborigine children
who had run away from their settlement dorm and who, with his passive
participation, had managed to “outwit” a superb tracker, Mr. Neville, called
Mr. Devil by the half-caste Aborigine children, uttered privately the
E. Helms ed., 1990) (citing a study that found that racist parents who opposed
miscegenation socialized their children to dislike the idea).
261. See generally ZEN MIND, supra note 11, at 23-49 (describing the author’s technique
for effective Zen meditation).
262. See INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 110 (noting that postcolonial theory
tells us that newly empowered groups can redeploy the oppressive structures against which
they fought); Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and
Interracial Justice, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 52 (1995) (observing that in
postcolonial countries, racial groups previously victimized may redefine their role and
become victimizers relative to other minority groups).
263. See Helms, supra note 260, at 94-96 (utilizing several studies of black and white
children and their parents’ political ideology to support the claim that children are prone to
perceiving their race in a similar manner to their parents).
264. See ORNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 29 (“[O]ur ‘agreement’ on the nature of reality,
done among right-thinking people, of course, is of course limited, because all of us share the
limitations that have presumably evolved to ensure the biological survival of the race.”).
265. RABBIT PROOF FENCE (Miramax Films 2002).
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unthinkable: Aborigines can think, sometimes outwitting the most attuned
white Australian. In this popular example based on actual events, it is more
than clear that blacks have agency, something that whites acknowledged by
actively enforcing racialized divides through force, violence, and public
authority.
In The Tracker, an Australian film in which a Tracker leads a white
Fanatic, along with a Young Soldier and an elderly Conscript, to find an
accused Aborigine man who they seek for allegedly killing a white
woman.266 Throughout the entire movie, the Fanatic, who represents an
overzealous, black extremist constantly harangues the Tracker, telling him
at every turn that he is dumber and lower than the Young Soldier who the
Fanatic views an incurably stupid. Yet, it becomes clear that the Fanatic
fears that the Tracker will awaken an awesome power that flows naturally
from the greater wisdom and unfathomable tolerance that the Tracker
already possesses. Despite the Fanatic’s constant badgering, he realizes
that without the Tracker he will certainly be lost in an Australian outback
where visible roads and organized civilization must be rare hen’s teeth. In
desperation, especially after the Tracker quietly disappears, ostensibly to
kill wild game so that they can all eat that night, the Fanatic orders the
Tracker shackled in a yoke, the chain-linked end of which he keeps in his
hand. Symbolically, the Fanatic reveals that what truly threatens the white
liberal state must be that blacks, regardless of their continental origins, will
awaken to embrace their already exercised power to think, to feel, to act,
and to talk—minds and agency. Unfortunately, for the Fanatic, the yoke
simply crystallized two points. First, the white liberal state did not have
power in a vacuum. Rather, this power depended inexorably on a
relationship with the Tracker. Second, the Tracker had to accept that until
he changed his mind, he would live this yoked existence. When the
Tracker decides to release himself from the yoke, ending the Fanatic’s
tyranny, causing the symbolic collapse of the state, the Tracker removes the
Fanatic from his horse, the means by which the Fanatic (the state) publicly
displayed his authority and power. In effect, the state cannot tower over
the bipedal Tracker (or over blacks) if they use their mind to remember
their human potential (or personality).
In sum, Rabbit Proof Fence and The Tracker dramatize that white
hegemony depends actively on blacks not exercising their mind and
agency. Accordingly, in America, like Rabbit Proof Fence and The
Tracker, white society uses force, violence, and public authority to
“encourage” blacks to co-create their personal experiences and social

266. THE TRACKER (Vertigo Productions Party Ltd. 2001).
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worlds through race, racial identity, and race consciousness.267 Although
this race, identity, and consciousness lack specific content, white society
requires blacks to think of themselves through socio-legal categories. In
fine Austinian fashion, one could find black and its meaning within
statutes, court rulings, and legislation. During the Antebellum era, whites
could perforce presume that all blacks were slaves. And with this
presumption, society has encouraged whites, especially the poorest and
most ignorant, to think that they were better than blacks. Thus, educated
blacks suffered affronts little different from slaves when either of them
encountered a poor white farmer. And so in the America context, as
dramatized by Rabbit Proof Fence and The Tracker, white society uses
race as a concept not just to structure relationships between group X and
group Y, but also to steal, to “hook,”268 the mind.269 And it preferred
stealing a black mind—one modified by the socially constructed and
defined adjective. What it meant to be black emanates out of socio-legal
imperatives. And so when a so-called black identifies with a “black
identity” and thinks through a “race consciousness,” she inflicts levels of
force, violence, and public authority onto herself, most of the effects
escaping her most immediate attention. More often, she will think that she
must naturally possess this identity, think through this lens, if she intends to
survive. By avoiding physical displays of force, violence, and public
authority, she internalizes the state’s myths, effectively limiting herself to a
horizon not initially of her own making. But lest we forget, when I
mention the state’s myth, please remember that her parents placed the first
narrative discourse into their children’s mouths, thus becoming a delivery
system that could potentially destroy their children’s mind, body, and spirit.
By taking on a black identity and by thinking through a race consciousness,
blacks give homage to their parents’ limited horizons, and they do
symbolic and mythic damage to themselves.
In this way, Giddens’ radical departure from a “structure” versus
“action” model to a duality of structure and agency takes Williams and
Yamamoto much further down the road to real, substantive agency. Under
his approach, Race Crits cannot simply develop more subtle versions of
structuralism, so that they can declare a border skirmish in which ordinary
people can be both victims and victimizers. Unfortunately, this construct
267. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT 35
(2000) (describing the process by which slave owners taught discipline through equating
blackness with inferiority).
268. See MIGUEL RUIZ, THE FOUR AGREEMENTS—A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERSONAL
FREEDOM: A TOLTEC WISDOM BOOK 3 (1997) (commenting that we learn what we do
because adults teach us what to believe).
269. See Helms, supra note 260, at 3, 6 (discussing social stereotypes about racial
groups and ascribed (e.g., voluntary) racial identity).
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does not advance ordinary people toward validating “bottom up” stories
and interracial justice. First, Williams and Yamamoto premised their
practices on the idea that ordinary people do not reproduce social life
except to the extent that a determining text overrides who they really are.
Second, they purport to eradicate the subordination and interracial conflicts
that flow from this degree of self-annihilating oppression by opening the
minds, hearts, and eyes of ordinary people so that they can see what they
can do about it. Third, Williams and Yamamoto need to ask: why does
CRT need to construct ordinary people as victims? Do these practices
replace a determining text of self-loathing with a framework that can never
imagine ordinary people as powerful reality creators? Fourth, by adopting
a model of radical subjectivism, Williams and Yamamoto would require
ordinary people to examine how their beliefs, thoughts, words, actions,
feelings, and imagination form a practice (e.g., a habit) that reproduces
oppression-like experiences. Under this subjectivism, they would require
ordinary people to focus within themselves, so that they can appreciate that
their so-called external, objective reality approximates their core beliefs.
This approach reveals that the locus of their personal experiences and
social realities emanates from within ordinary people.
Under a
structuration theory, Giddens comes very close to this latter proposition.
However, he rejects radical subjectivism, and to this extent, Giddens’
theory cannot found a new paradigm in which ordinary people are not
victims but earthly gods.
D. Pure Consciousness and Human Agency:
A Provisional Model for True Human Liberation
Unlike Williams and Yamamoto’s antisubordination practice in which
the ordinary person perennially struggles to reclaim her proper place of
dignity which she lost at the hands of the liberal state, and unlike Giddens’
radical departure from even Yamamoto’s complex structuralist model in
which human agents produce and reproduce virtual structures that cannot
exist without their day-to-day routines, a pure consciousness model of
human agency begins with a mind that exists prior to social awareness. In
a structuration model, human agents produce and reproduce social life, thus
having the power to change virtual institutions and structural properties that
appear to exist across time-space. In Giddens’ world, even human agents
who are resource dependent can transform so-called powerful agents.270
Yet, for epistemological reasons, Giddens refuses to acknowledge what he

270. See CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 233, at 16 (“But all forms of dependence
offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their
superiors. This is what I call the dialectics of control in social systems.”).
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impliedly suggests: human agents not only construct social life but also
transform structures. Accordingly, the locus for social reality is day-to-day
human activities. Neither of these approaches views ordinary people as
truly empowered. In liberal theory, the state grants legal personhood to
citizens. In structuration theory, Giddens never questions this presumption,
but rather focuses on human agents reproducing structures to which they
bind themselves. They can reinforce or transform social life, and to this
extent, ordinary humans can be agents for freedom, justice, and peace.
In the pure consciousness model of human agency, the power on which
ordinary people rely always exists prior to social life. It is innate to every
human being, and it is the very way in which architects develop a drawing
and elevations out of which later springs the Empire State Building. What
is prior is pure consciousness. By pure consciousness, I mean an
intelligent, extremely knowledgeable energy on which all living things
depend.271 It is aware and alert. It has a voice through which it “talks” to
ordinary people, and it is the “psychological strength from which your
physically oriented self springs.”272 In this sense, this consciousness
extends to the “inner ego,” directing inner activities, correlating
information that it perceives beyond the physical senses: “It is the inner
perceiver of reality that exists beyond the three-dimensional. It carries
within it the memory of each of your past existences. It looks into
subjective dimensions that are literally infinite and from these subjective
dimensions all objective realities flow.”273
In this model, the inner and outer egos work together. The inner ego
brings ordinary people delicate inner perceptions (e.g., intuitive knowing),
without which they could not maintain their physical existence. The outer
ego permits ordinary people to change the world.274
Nevertheless, a consciousness exists that has a deeper identity, and it
forms the inner and outer egos. It decided that an ordinary person would be
a physical being in this time and place. This consciousness forms the core
of an ordinary person’s identity, the veritable psychic seed from which she
springs, the multidimensional personality of which she is a part.275 Between
the inner and outer egos, the subconscious rests. Yet, no real separation
exists between them.

271. ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 9 (referring to a theoretical division of the mind of
which the conscious mind is unaware, but which is essential to the functioning of the
physical existence).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. (noting that it is the outer ego that allows people to operate and to
manipulate the world around them).
275. Id. at 9-10.
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In this taxonomy, the outer ego becomes vital, but ordinary people give
too much weight to it. They thus become their gender, their race, their
class, their nationality. By identifying too strongly with the outer ego,
ordinary people adopt artificial limitations. They limit their potential.
They become ignorant. They cut themselves off from natural abilities.276
In social life, ordinary people thus deny these abilities, but they cannot alter
them.277
In social life, the outer ego is a jealous god. It needs to be served. It
rejects the reality of any dimensions except that to which it has become
comfortable and can understand. In manipulating this physical existence,
the outer ego was meant to aid ordinary people, but by denying their
natural abilities, ordinary people have assisted the outer ego in becoming a
tyrant. Despite the dominant position ordinary people have given the outer
ego, it is resilient, and it is eager to learn. Although somewhat rigid, the
outer ego is innately curious. This curiosity has great value.
And so by denying their natural abilities and by adopting a limited
concept of the nature of reality, ordinary people experience the physical
world through an outer ego that will do its very best to keep ordinary
people in a very small, fixed area of accepted reality. Yet, with the
impulses from the inner ego, ordinary people’s intuition and creative
instincts still have freedom.278
In this pure consciousness model, ordinary people create physical reality.
It cannot exist without them. Relying on this prior consciousness, they
project their thoughts outward into physical form. It is an awesome gift. It
carries great responsibility. And so, en masse, ordinary people collectively
create glories and terrors. By failing to appreciate this gift, ordinary people
blame God, fate, and society’s failures. Yet, ordinary people bear this
responsibility.279
In this model, powerfully gifted ordinary people are like Kant’s
autonomous subject,280 and they are not too different from the latest
findings in physics and neuroscience. Kant’s autonomous subject legislates
for herself. Not minding human anthropology, this subject acts according
276. See ROLLO MAY, THE DISCOVERY OF BEING: WRITINGS IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY
18 (1983). For May, natural abilities are unconscious potentialities that humans, perhaps
those who embrace a radical identity, repress. He writes: “[The unconscious] inescapably
raises the question of the human being’s margin of freedom with respect to his potentialities,
a margin in which resides his responsibility for himself which even the therapist cannot take
away.” Id.
277. ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 12.
278. Id. at 12-13.
279. See id. at 6 (stating that each person creates their own physical reality and that
shortfalls in this reality should not be blamed on a higher being).
280. See PINKARD, supra note 217, at 5 (defining Kant’s autonomous subject as a moral
person who acts according to his own idea of laws that can be applied to every rational
person).
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to her idea of law. Accordingly, this subject guides herself according to
principles that can be universally valid for every rational agent. By acting
according to these self-given but universally valid rules, an ordinary person
becomes Kant’s autonomous subject. To this extent, this subject models
morality itself.281 In Kant’s schema, the autonomous subject exists in her
rational self, her essential self, and she eschews her liberal, contingent self.
Moreover, her actions express our true self.
In this pure consciousness model, Kant’s autonomous subject is the
ordinary person. Like Kant’s subject, the ordinary person never forgets her
natural connection to pure consciousness, and she minds her inner ego as
much as she does her outer. In this way, she can manipulate the physical
world, but she does so in a way that bears witness to her awesome gift to
co-create physical reality. In her dealings with others, she acts morally.
Always channeling a higher consciousness that resides in a
multidimensional reality, she subscribes to powerful reality creating
principles that apply universally. She thus acknowledges no difference
between herself and other earthly gods. In this way, she is always a
rational agent because she abides by higher, spiritual principles in the way
she encounters her thoughts projected out into the physical world, including
every ordinary person she meets.
To this extent, the ordinary person in the pure consciousness model and
Kant’s autonomous subject have abilities that physicists and neuroscientists
have come to acknowledge. John Wheeler, a physicist, states that when
humans observe, they create physical reality.282
Karl Pribram, a
neurophysiologist and brain surgeon, states that what humans perceive as
an “out there” experience is really brain processes.283 That is, the nature of
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Tim Folger, Does the Universe Exist if We’re not Looking?, DISCOVER,
June 2002, at 46 (quoting Wheeler’s belief that we shape reality through our observations).
According to Andrei Linde, quantum physicist from Stanford University:
The universe and the observer exist as a pair. . . . You can say that the universe is
there only when there is an observer who can say, ‘Yes, I see the universe there.’
These small words—it looks like it was here—for practical purposes it may not
matter much, but for me as a human being, I do not know any sense in which I
could claim that the universe is here in the absence of observers. We are together,
the universe and us. The moment you say that the universe exists without any
observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent
theory of everything that ignores consciousness. A recording device cannot play
the role of an observer, because who will read what is written on this recording
device? In order for us to see that something happens, and say to one another that
something happens, you need to have a universe, you need to have a recording
device, and you need to have us. It’s not enough for the information to be stored
somewhere, completely inaccessible to anybody. It’s necessary for somebody to
look at it. You need an observer who looks at the universe. In the absence of
observers, our universe is dead.
Id. at 48.
283. See KARL PRIBRAM, LANGUAGES OF THE BRAIN: EXPERIMENTAL PARADOX AND THE
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reality is holographic; its concreteness is an illusion. Eastern mystics have
always told us that consciousness affects matter and alters it.284 Lastly,
Ronald Laing, a psychologist, sees no separation between inner and outer
experiences.285
In this model of pure consciousness, ordinary people can achieve true
liberation. They control their destiny. They control what happens in the
very next second of their lives. If our destinies are composed of a million
billion seconds, we can deliberately co-create our very futures by the
degree to which we take personal responsibility for becoming the
autonomous subject that Kant describes. We enjoy this degree of liberty if
we discipline our beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and imaginations. With these
three elements, we co-create every experience. We physically materialize
our mental acts as physical matter.286 Seth writes:
You are intuitively aware that you form your [bodily] image, and that
you are independent of it. You do not realize that you create your larger
environment and the physical world as you know it by propelling your
thoughts and emotions into matter—a breakthrough into threedimensional life. The inner self, therefore, individually and en masse,
sends its psychic energy out, forming tentacles that coalesce into form.287

Endowed naturally with these gifts, ordinary people co-create their
personal experiences even if they refuse to acknowledge this power.288
This refusal simply means that they have placed their fate in others:
parents, Race Crits, the state, God, or ignorance. Unfortunately, this
refusal does not cease co-creation. Rather, these ordinary people still use
their minds to create, influence, and form matter. If they like their
experiences, they perhaps will feel blessed and thank a higher power. If
they dislike their experiences, they most assuredly will feel defeated,
abandoned, oppressed, or marginalized. By embracing the gift to co-create
with which every human being is endowed, ordinary people become
PRINCIPLES OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 99 (1971) (arguing that based on animal studies, subjects
construct external reality using two-sided, balanced brain sensory stimulation); GERALD M.
EDELMAN & GIULIO TONONI, A UNIVERSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: HOW MATTER BECOMES
IMAGINATION 18 (2000) (“[E]ach conscious state is experienced as a whole that cannot be
subdivided into independent components. . . . [E]ach conscious state is selected from a
repertoire of billions and billions of possible conscious states, each with different behavioral
consequences.”).
284. TALBOT, supra note 2, at 102 (quoting Satprem, who stated,“[c]onsciousness can
act on Matter and transform it. This ultimate conversion of Matter into Consciousness and
perhaps one day even of Consciousness into Matter is the aim of the supramental yoga.”).
285. See R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 21 (1968) (“The ‘inner,’ then, is our
personal idiom of experiencing our bodies, other people, the animate and inanimate world;
imagination, dreams, fantasy, and beyond that to even further reaches of experiences.”).
286. ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 38.
287. Id. at 41.
288. See id. at 25 (“Using the inner senses, we become conscious creators, cocreators.
But you are unconscious cocreators whether you know it or not.”).
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proverbial captains of their fate. By modeling themselves after Kant’s
autonomous subject and by opening themselves to multidimensional
energy, these ordinary people can achieve a liberation that CRT promises
and that antidiscrimination practices seek, and they do so by constantly
examining their thoughts, emotions, and imaginations. True liberation
means that ordinary people not only use their naturally endowed gifts to cocreate their personal experiences and social realities, but also act
responsibly toward other things and subjects, knowing full well that what
they encounter is simply an extension of their own thoughts.
CONCLUSION: CAN WE IMAGINE ORDINARY PEOPLE AS EARTHLY GODS?
In the main, I have difficulty with CRT and antisubordination practices
because Race Crits simply cannot imagine that ordinary people have
always been powerful reality creators, earthly gods. Even during slavery,
they had always exercised levels of human agency that allowed them to
overcome social and personal hurdles. In large and small ways, ordinary
people have altered the magnitude of many social experiments, and even
today, they play a vital role in co-creating a better world for all of us. Ella
Fitzgerald, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Ang San Suu Kyi,
and Rosa Parks perhaps did not know that they were powerful reality
creators. Yet, they were fired by a vision of a better, freer world from
which we would all benefit. I imagine that they did not use self-defeating
terms like victim. I also imagine that they took their visions and behind
them, they placed their minds (e.g., thought) and deeply felt desires (e.g.,
emotions). We see the results. Although they lived (and still live) in
challenging times and places on our planet, they nevertheless fulfilled their
life’s purpose that was (and is) quite unique to their multidimensional
awareness. These ordinary people were (and are) Kant’s autonomous
subjects. Although ordinary people, they embraced an unspoken power to
co-create, and they did so as earthly gods.
In their antisubordination practices, Williams and Yamamoto could not
imagine ordinary people as already empowered. They cannot see them as
earthly gods, beings who use their human agency to co-create in every
second of their lives. As Giddens would say, the double hermeneutics of
sociology means that Williams and Yamamoto must ask themselves if they
are in fact empowered people. Do they have co-creative control and power
in their lives? If so, how are they different from the ordinary people about
whom they write?
If not, how can they actually construct an
antisubordination practice that truly promotes interracial justice and group
agency? Is it not like parents teaching their children to read when they
have never learned themselves? Is there something inherent in CRT that
preaches empowerment and permits Race Crits to hold imaginations in
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which the very people they wish to help must perforce be victims and
unwitting stooges for structural forces? None of these questions ever gets
taken up by Race Crits. Emboldened by a liberal framework that purports
to be critical theory, Race Crits simply launch into the usual speech about
an evil world that needs changing for people for whom they hold in
contempt. Why save people who based on theoretical assumptions cannot
imagine saving themselves? In my community service days and in my
personal space, I have attempted to save people; I failed miserably. Like
giving sight to the blind, I can only heal those who have already deeply
committed themselves to seeing!
In this Article, I hope that I have illustrated why CRT is not the way of
liberation. This theory does not require Race Crits to examine themselves.
It does not question what it can achieve. As we know, this theory can
achieve no more than Race Crits can imagine, and if they cannot imagine
themselves as powerful reality creators who walk this planet as living
earthly gods, then who do they imagine ordinary people to be? We can
begin by refusing to use “victims” to describe any human agent. We can
begin by examining CRT so that we can unearth where we have buried our
personal fears and self-defeating ideas. In their antisubordination practices,
Williams and Yamamoto simply assumed that CRT can deliver us, and
without asking critical questions about this critical theory, they blamed
structural forces. They promised liberation, justice, and agency, but they
more often than not suggested that white supremacy and structural shifts
better explain what ordinary people experience in their lives. In effect,
these antisubordination practices rescue ordinary people from a burning
building, and after helping them find a new place to live, they watch them
light a cigarette and get into the bed. They never tell them that smoking in
bed is dangerous. Yet, they tell them to lock the front door. After all,
society can be a very dangerous place. CRT must examine ordinary people
and the way they believe, think, feel, and imagine the world. By doing so,
Race Crits will find the keys to true liberation.
Unfortunately, the provisional ideas for a pure consciousness model of
human agency cannot answer all of the questions that I have raised against
antisubordination practices and CRT. It is sketchy, and I have not worked
through all of its practical problems.
Yet, I started down this
epistemological road some years ago when I wrote a book review of Black
Wealth/White Wealth and American Apartheid.289 In part, I wrote:
289. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Poverty, the Underclass, and the Role of Race
Consciousness: A New Age Critique of Black Wealth/White Wealth and American
Apartheid, 34 IND. L. REV. 1377, 1420-21 (2001) (book review) (arguing that blacks must
take responsibility for their own poverty and residential segregation and advocating for a
New Age race consciousness).
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Neither Black Wealth/White Wealth nor American Apartheid accepted
the idea that we can change our historically derived points of view.
Although both books prescribed what it would take to create material
equality between blacks and whites and to end residential segregation,
neither book positioned blacks or minorities in the center of the human
chemistry that co-created the social and economic inequalities in the first
place. As such, both books relegated the co-creative subject to historical
footnotes and partially interesting marginalia. Unlike Oliver and Shapiro
and Massey and Denton, I think that we can re-imagine ourselves as the
powerful reality creators. In this case, we become subjects/agents.
Despite the powerful sociological narratives that Black Wealth/White
Wealth and American Apartheid represented, they described blacks and
whites as action figures, all of whom were posed by the deft hand of
social structures. In these narratives, we looked at whites as racists and
wrongdoers, failing to see them for what they are—angelic humans
working through social experiments, some wonderfully successful, some
dangerously wrong.290

I still feel that ordinary people must be placed at the core of what they
experience, and in so doing, we can hold them and ourselves responsible.
Right now, these antisubordination practices advocate an empowerment
that dies aborning. It permits purportedly liberated, empowered people to
fault others. Under his duality of structure and agency, Giddens nicely
ends this self-defeating practice, but he rejects radical subjectivism even
though his sociological model urges us in that direction.291 Unfortunately, I
cannot blame his model for my New Age Legal Theory, in which human
beings remain my primary locus for analysis because I know that by
examining them and myself, I can co-create a liberation experience that I
can share.292
By bridging my way through Giddens, I hope that I have convinced
some of you to venture down this road with me. Yet, I can imagine I have
frightened off many of you, and some of you knew what you would get
before you picked up this Article. Even assuming that my New Age Legal
Theory is just pure fiction, my fiction liberates.293 To the extent that I have
described universal principles that govern us all, I do not have to be correct.
I have to keep you interested. In this sense, “I am in the business of

290. See id. at 1441 (concluding that the two books reviewed do not portray an adequate
picture of how blacks should approach a sociological theory of race).
291. CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 233, at 1-2.
292. See MAY, supra note 276, at 14-15 (arguing that we can help people if we can share
the immediacy of an experience, and so he preferred Kierkegaard’s experience of anxiety
because he “knew anxiety” as opposed to Freud who “knew about anxiety”).
293. Schlag, supra note 26, at 46 (referring to Fish’s statement: “My fiction is
liberating.”).
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making texts and of teaching others to make them by adding to their
repertoire of strategies.”294

294. Id. (citing STANLEY FISH, IS THERE TEXT IN THE CLASS? 180 (1980)).

